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 Looking at the United States Constitution, the Founding Fathers provided little 
instruction for the implementation of public policy.  Article II, Section 2 stipulated, “Congress 
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as they think proper, in the President 
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”1 With the creation of this 
administrative state in the later twentieth century, Congress passed laws governing its structure, 
processes, and procedures.  This essay examines one such law: the Hatch Act of 1939.  This 
federal government required an increased number of employees to run this bureaucracy.  The 
Hatch Act defined how these federal employees could interact with political campaigns.  
  Congress passed this law in 1939, at the end of the New Deal period.  After the Great 
Depression crippled the national economy, nearly one-third of Americans were unemployed.  In 
1932, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt won the presidency on the pledge that he would bring 
a “new deal for the American people.”2  Roosevelt’s New Deal consisted of unprecedented 
expansion of the federal government through the creation of executive agencies.  To restore faith 
in the market, the Roosevelt administration created the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
(AAA) and the National Recovery Administration (NRA) respectively regulated farm and 
industry through price and competition control.  Public works agencies like the Public Works 
Administration (PWA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) developed national 
infrastructure while simultaneously decreasing unemployment.  The Civilian Conservation Corps 
(CCC) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) created federal conservation efforts that also 
                                                 
1 United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2. 
2 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “FDR’s Democratic Nomination Acceptance Speech, July 2, 1932,” in 
Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New 
York: Random House, 1938), I: 647-659. 
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helped modernize rural areas.  After 1935, New Deal legislation focused more on reform than 
restoration, including long-lasting laws such as the 1935 Social Security Act and the 1937 
National Labor Relations Act (also known as the Wagner Act). 
 This paper argues that the Hatch Act of 1939 was a response to the administrative state 
intended as a way to protect American constitutionalism by preserving free and fair elections.  
Proponents contended this bill prevented a national spoils system which the president would use 
to control electoral outcomes.  Conversely, the opposition disapproved of the Hatch Act because 
it restricted federal employees’ ability to participate on political campaigns.  Declaring this bill a 
clear violation of civil liberties, opponents compared its restrictions to foreign totalitarian 
measures in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.  Both sides couched their arguments in relation to 
preservation of the American form of government against dictatorship.  This paper asserts that 
fascism and totalitarianism abroad, coupled with the executive branch’s gross expansion, shaped 
this debate.  In historical context, Americans had no guarantee that their government would not 
descend down this course.  When Roosevelt performed unprecedented actions in the executive 
branch, it signaled such a shift.  Therefore, Congress placed restrictions like the Hatch Act on the 
federal government and its employees.  
  Furthermore, this essay ties the Hatch Act into the greater context of New Deal legal and 
legislative history.  As described in the historiographical section, New Deal legal and 
constitutional histories have overwhelmingly focused on President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
“court-packing” bill and the “constitutional revolution of 1937,” a period when the Supreme 
Court reversed previous conservative decisions in favor of upholding New Deal legislation.  
Finally, this essay argues that the Hatch Act indicated a continued constitutional opposition to 
the New Deal that occurred in Congress, not just the Supreme Court. 
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 When studying the past, previous historical writings influence contemporary 
interpretations as much as the primary sources.  To support this argument, this essay analyzes the 
historiography of the New Deal, the legal and constitutional transformation of the 1930s, and the 
Hatch Act of 1939.  Collectively, these components demonstrate how this thesis expands upon 
current literature by arguing that the Hatch Act represented a constitutional backlash against the 
New Deal’s administrative expansion.   
This essay first examines past New Deal histories, ranging from Roosevelt administration 
officials to modern historians.  Upon inspection, these histories revealed interpretive 
discrepancies stemming from their author’s historical context.  Reviewing this historiography 
demonstrates how understanding the New Deal’s successes and failures depends upon which 
sources are consulted. 
Next, this essay examines the constitutional and legal transformations that occurred 
during the New Deal.  As previously mentioned, the New Deal ushered in an era of federal 
growth.  This enlargement defined governance in the United States throughout the remainder of 
the twentieth century.  Given this importance, legal and constitutional historians dedicated texts 
to describing this development’s causes and case law.  Most previous works in this category have 
suggested that a constitutional “revolution” occurred in 1937 because of President Roosevelt’s 
“court-packing” bill.  Nevertheless, recent revisionist works question the transition’s causality 
and instead emphasize prolonged jurisprudential factors.  These works assessed Supreme Court 
litigation throughout the 1930s to illustrate how the Court and the national constitution shifted in 
favor of a large federal government.  Detailing this literature helps explain the constitutional and 
legal environment in which the Hatch Act of 1939 came into being. 
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This final historiographical section reviews the existing literature on the Hatch Act of 
1939.  During the late 1930s, corruption rumors stained the New Deal’s legacy as opponents 
attested that Roosevelt used executive agencies to influence congressional elections.  These 
reports prompted Congress to pass the Hatch Act of 1939.  Intended to curb “pernicious political 
activities,” the Hatch Act restricted federal executive employees’ ability to participate in political 
campaigns.  This statute endured into the twenty-first century and still governs these interactions. 
However, scholars have produced little on this litigation.  Law reviews and articles generally 
replaced objectivity with subjectivity and made personal evaluations about the act.  The existing 
monographs succeeded in describing the act’s provisions, but those texts failed to place the act in 
the larger constitutional and legal context of the 1930s.  
 After assessing the relevant historical literature, this paper describes the workings of the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the scandal that ensued in Kentucky during the 1938 
Democratic Party primary.  This specific election scandal helped heighten attention to potential 
executive branch corruption, prompting the Senate to launch a national investigation into the 
issue.  Through this special committee, the Senate discovered rampant political activities across 
the country.  The body recommended Congress pass legislation to prohibit future political 
activities in elections.  Congress responded with the Hatch Act of 1939.  During the debate for 
this bill, legislators voiced different opinions grounded in constitutional concerns.  This 
legislative discussion provided the evidence for conservative opposition to the New Deal and the 
administrative state.  Then, this text covers the Hatch Act’s remaining legal history, examining 
the Supreme Court decisions that tested its constitutionality and subsequent amendments to the 
law.   
II. Literature Review 
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A. New Deal Historiography 
Even before President Roosevelt died in 1945, historians wrote accounts covering his 
landmark legislative agenda.  Like the American Revolution and the Civil War, different 
historical schools treated this subject differently.  The attitude these historians adopt towards the 
New Deal depended upon the historical period in which the author wrote.  This trend in New 
Deal historiography exemplified the idea that historians write about and interpret the past from 
the perspective of their own historical context.  More importantly, Stuart Kidd argued that these 
reinterpretations of the New Deal were important because they demonstrated the country’s 
ability to persist through a crisis.3 
 A few historiographical debates surrounded the New Deal.  First, historians questioned 
the ideological underpinnings of the New Deal.  Comparing it to previous reform movements in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they analyzed the ideological origins of the New Deal.  In 
this debate, past historians either viewed the New Deal as liberal or conservative. 
Where early historians like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Frank Freidel, and William E. Leuchtenburg 
praised the New Deal as a revolutionary advancement in American governance, the succeeding 
New Left historians of the 1960s denounced it as a conservative ploy to establish corporate 
dominance in the United States.  More recently scholarship transcended this binary argument to 
suggest that Roosevelt and the New Deal operated, and succeed, through pragmatism. 
Second, historians questioned whether the New Deal succeeded at all.  Where 
Schlesinger Jr., and Freidel praised the program for rebuilding the national economy, New Left 
historians like Howard Zinn and Ronald Radosh marked it a failure for not extending legal 
protections to African Americans or abolishing the United States’ capitalist economy.  Similarly, 
                                                 
3 Stuart Kidd, “Redefining the New Deal: Some Thoughts on the Political and Cultural 
Perspectives of Revisionism,” Journal of American Studies 22 (Dec. 1988), 389.  
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historians in the 1990s adopted a more moderate view by conceding both points: the New Deal 
did not assist African Americans or southern tenant farmers or even fully revitalize the economy, 
but it prevented additional damage, instilled economic security in the American people, and 
assist oppressed interest groups. 
 Political actors from the 1930s and 1940s published the first New Deal histories even 
before the Roosevelt administration had ended.  Initially, former Roosevelt administration 
members described the president and the New Deal, in a positive fashion.  Robert Sherwood, a 
former Roosevelt speech-writer, published a favorable recollection of the relationship between 
President Roosevelt and Works Progress Administration operator Harry Hopkins.4  In his 
autobiography, Harold L. Ickes, Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior, praised the Public Works 
Administration (PWA), an early New Deal work-relief program.  He lauded, “Had not Franklin 
Roosevelt come along when he did with his PWA cornucopia in 1933, we might today be doing 
the goose step.”5 Roosevelt’s campaign manager and later Chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee, James Farley, approached hagiography in his comments.  “Few, if any, can dispute 
the value of such organizations as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and the Home Owners Loan Corporation,” he acclaimed, “All must 
concede the magnificence of such projects as Grand Coulee, Fort Peek, and the Tennessee 
Valley.  While these originated in other minds, he had the audacity to adopt them and follow 
them through.”6  While their personal connections provided succeeding historians with first-hand 
                                                 
4 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An intimate History (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1948). 
5 Harold L. Ickes, The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1943), 
298. 
6 James A. Farley, Jim Farley’s Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc., 1948), 38.  Farley pushed a similar story in his previous work Behind the 
Ballots: The Personal History of a Politician (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938).  
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accounts of the New Deal’s inner-workings, their affection for Roosevelt made objectivity 
elusive. 
 The second generation of New Deal historians came with the consensus historians of the 
1950s.  In reaction to the progressive historian’s emphasis on class conflict and economic 
struggle in United States history, these historians believed that unity and homogeneity drove 
change; they stressed national character over disruptive social movements.7  In this school, 
Pulitzer prize-winning historian Richard Hofstadter’s Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (1955) 
first sought to place the New Deal in the larger scheme of United States intellectual and political 
history.  After examining the Populist and Progressive movements of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, he ended his analysis by comparing these trends to the New Deal.  “In 
the years 1933-38 the New Deal sponsored a series of legislative changes that made the 
enactments of the Progressive era seem timid by comparison,” Hofstadter emphasized, “The 
New Deal was different from anything that had yet happened in the United States: different 
because its central problem was unlike the problems of Progressivism; different in its ideas and 
spirits and its techniques.”8  Where the Progressive movement employed government action to 
combat social problems such as poverty, conservation, and consumer protection, Roosevelt’s 
New Deal employed government--especially the central, federal government-- to resuscitate the 
national economy.  Both the Progressive movement and the New Deal viewed government as the 
primary agent for change, but the New Deal did so on an unprecedented scale. 
 The other two consensus historians were Otis Graham, Jr., and James MacGregor Burns.   
                                                 
7 Aaron D. Purcell, “Historical Interpretations of the New Deal and the Great Depression,” in 
Aaron D. Purcell, ed., Interpreting American History: The New Deal and the Great Depression 
(Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 2014), 13.  
8 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 
1955), 302-304.  
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James MacGregor Burns’ two-part Roosevelt biography dedicated one volume to his early life 
and the New Deal and the second volume to World War II.  This first book, Roosevelt: The Lion 
and the Fox (1956), argued that Roosevelt created a “broker state” within the United States 
where different politics competed for attention.  In other words, the New Deal initiated an era of 
interest group politics that persisted for decades.9  In An Encore for Reform: The Old 
Progressives and the New Deal (1967), Otis Graham Jr., disagreed with Hofstadter.  The New 
Deal served as a continuation of the Progressive movement he argued.10 
 In United States historiography, liberal historians in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
supplanted the consensus historians.  These historians overwhelmingly saw the New Deal as a 
liberal success, meaning popular political sentiment drove government to curb corporations and 
privilege.11  For the New Deal, the three main historians included Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
Frank Freidel, and William E. Leuchtenburg. 
 Any discussion of New Deal scholarship must spend significant time on Arthur M. 
Schlesinger’s three-part Age of Roosevelt series.12  His first volume, The Crisis of the Old Order 
(1957), began by analyzing the ideological agendas that influence the New Deal.  Drawing on 
the preceding two decades of United States history, the New Deal tapped into two Progressive 
traditions: Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism and Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom.  
Additionally, Crisis followed Roosevelt’s early years and his presidential campaigns.   
                                                 
9 James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Smithmark Books, 
1956).  
10 Otis Graham Jr., An Encore for Reform: The Old Progressives and the New Deal (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1967). 
11 Aaron D. Purcell, “Historical Interpretations of the New Deal and the Great Depression,” 10-
12.  
12 The three works in this series are The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Mariner Books, 1957), The Coming of the New Deal, 1933-1935 (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Mariner Books, 1958), and The Politics of Upheaval, 1935-1936 (Boston 
Massahcusetts: Mariner Books, 1960). 
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Schlesinger’s coverage of the New Deal did not begin until the second volume, The 
Coming of the New Deal (1958).  Here, he analyzed the political struggles involved with passing 
and implementing each of these programs.  Even though the National Recovery Administration 
crumbled under “a mass of multifarious administrative responsibilities,” he argued it “prepared 
the nation for a greater and more arduous crisis.”13  Through the Wagner Act, the New Deal 
transformed the labor movement into a formidable political force.  For Schlesinger, Social 
Security had the greatest impact on American society.  “The federal government was at last 
charged with the obligation to provide its citizens a measure of protection from the hazards and 
vicissitudes of life,” he wrote, “With the Social Security Act, the constitutional dedication of 
federal power to the general welfare began a new phase of national history.”14 
The final volume, The Politics of Upheaval, described the post-depression fragmentation 
that complicated the years after 1935.  “The policies which had produced the economic and 
moral revival seemed themselves to be faltering.  For two years the New Deal had been living off 
the momentum of the Hundred Days,” he remarked, “Now the grand initiatives of 1933 appeared 
to be running their course.”15  Schlesinger argues that Roosevelt held national attendance by 
creating a new national coalition.  “The older conception of the Democratic Party implied the 
politics of organization.  The new conception implied the politics of ideology.”16  This new 
Democratic Party shirked the traditional party bosses and political machines to form a voting 
coalition ranging from urban white progressives to African American workers.  These voting 
blocs carried Roosevelt to victory in the 1936 presidential election  
                                                 
13 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, 176. 
14Ibid., 315.  
15 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval, 3.  
16 Ibid., 409.  
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 While these three volumes ignored the ground level impact of New Deal agencies like 
TVA and WPA, they provided more information than any other study about the political context 
of the New Deal. Though he planned to write five volumes on the Roosevelt presidency, 
Schlesinger’s time in President John F. Kennedy’s administration limited his scholarly pursuits.  
Furthermore, The Age of Roosevelt series served as a spiritual sequel to Schlesinger’s previous 
work.  Mirroring his Pulitzer Prize- wining study on the political changes under President 
Andrew Jackson, Schlesinger contended that the New Deal represented a liberal retaliation 
against the conservative business interests of the 1920s.17  This connection between the 
antebellum period and the 1930s buttressed Schlesinger’s cyclical theory of history, arguing that 
United States history fluctuated between periods of political conservatism and liberalism.18  
Though subsequent historians critiqued this hypothesis, Schlesinger’s work remained relevant 
for future discussions of the New Deal. 
Roosevelt’s primary biographer, Frank Freidel treated Roosevelt as conservative but 
revolutionary nonetheless.  Though conceding “how basically conservative Roosevelt’s New 
Deal attitudes remained during the early period of the New Deal,” Freidel later stressed, “From 
the beginning of the New Deal to the end, Roosevelt functioned with a fair degree of 
consistency.  He heartily favored humanitarian welfare legislation and government policing of 
the economy, so long as these did not dangerously unbalance the budget.  He preferred 
government co-operation with business to warfare with it.”19  In perspective, Freidel claimed, 
                                                 
17 This work is similarly titled Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1945).  
18 Schlesinger outlined this theory in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History 
(Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), 23-48.  
19 Frank Freidel, The New Deal in Historical Perspective (Washington, D.C.: Service Center for 
Teachers of History, 1959), 19. Freidel also adopted this view in his four-volume biographical 
series on Roosevelt.  He condensed this series into a single volume, Frank Freidel, Franklin D. 
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“For millions of American farmers and workers, and for a large part of that businessmen, the 
massive federal intervention in the economy, the planning and rationalization, and the controls 
over production, prices, and wages during World War I had seemed benign.”20 
 Taking a step back, William E. Leuchtenburg also viewed the New Deal as 
transformative, but with reservations.  Leuchtenburg argued, “In 1932, men of acumen were 
absorbed to an astonishing degree with such questions as prohibitions, war debts, and law 
enforcement.  In 1936, they were debating social security, the Wagner Act, valley authorities, 
and public authorities.”21  Aside from the political subject matter, Roosevelt reshaped the 
presidency by increasing its legislative capacities.  The New Deal also transformed federalism.  
He contended, “For the first time for many Americans, the federal government became an 
institution that was directly experienced.  More than state and local governments, it came to be 
the government, an agency directly concerned with their welfare.”22  Nonetheless, government 
assistance did not extend to everyone.  Leuchtenburg acknowledged, “This was still a halfway 
revolution; it swelled the ranks of the bourgeoisie but left many Americans—sharecroppers, 
slum dwellers, most Negroes—outside of the new equilibrium.”23  Short and concise, 
Leuchtenburg’s work provided the best overview of the New Deal period. 
Nevertheless, no historian attested to the New Deal’s supposed radical nature more than 
Carl N. Degler.  “Almost every one of the best-known measures of the federal government 
during the Depression era made inroads into the hitherto private preserves of businesses and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 
1990). 
20 Ibid., 93. 
21William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: 
Harper Colopjon Books, 1963), 326.  
22 Ibid., 331.  
23 Ibid., 347. 
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individual,” Degler asserted, “Furthermore, most of these new measures survived the period, 
taking their places as fundamental elements in the structure of American life. For modern 
Americans living under a federal government of transcendent influence and control in the 
economy, this is the historic meaning of the Great Depression.”24  In his work, Degler called the 
Great Depression and New Deal the “Third American Revolution,” with the American Civil War 
being the second.  This label stressed the importance of the New Deal as a watershed in United 
States history. 
During this same period, Edgar Eugene Robinson’s The Roosevelt Leadership, 1933-
1945 (1955) first criticized FDR and the New Deal.25  Following a similar structure, Robinson 
focused on FDR’s leadership style within the presidency and its outcomes on constitutionalism.  
Like Leuchtenburg and Degler, he viewed the New Deal as a revolutionary transformation in 
United States governance, but not for the better.  “Despite winning the war and maintaining the 
support of the American people, Franklin Roosevelt underwent the supreme tragedy of effective 
leadership,” Robinson rebutted, “This tragedy lay not in the fact that death robbed him of 
triumph.  The inexorable forces of his time engulfed the world, revealing the basic weakness and 
long-enduring follies that existed among the American people he had served so long.”26  This 
piece’s conservative approach chided New Deal policies like Social Security for favoring welfare 
legislation over “a heightened sense of individual responsibility.”27  Not only did this author 
disagree with Roosevelt’s approach to the Depression, he maligned the New Deal as “injurious 
                                                 
24 Carl N. Degler, Out of Our Past: Forces that Shaped Modern America (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1959), 417.  
25 Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership, 1932-1945 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 
J.B. Lippincott Company, 1955). 
26 Ibid., 391.  
27 Ibid., 172.  
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to the slow working of democracy as Americans know it.”28  The author’s sources included 
contemporary magazines such as Life and Time, detracting any credibility from his argument.  
Primarily arguing in abstracts, The Roosevelt Leadership’s only important contribution to New 
Deal historiography was to denote that conservative interpretations existed as early as the 1950s.  
 In the 1960s, a new historiographical school called the “New Left” entered the field.  
Providing a stark contrast to the social conformity of the consensus historians, the New Left 
arose during a period of social upheaval in the United States.  The Civil Rights Movement and 
antiwar movement later in the decade attempted to reshape American society by ending racial 
divisions and ending ideological warfare.  With this information in mind, these historians 
projected their visions for contemporary society onto their descriptions of the past.  Furthermore, 
written during the Cold War, many of these accounts exhibited Marxist ideologies as they 
chastised Roosevelt for perpetuating American capitalism. 
Rejecting previous interpretations, Barton J. Bernstein contended, “The New Deal failed 
to solve the problem of depression, it failed to raise the impoverished, it failed to redistribute 
income, it failed to extend equality and generally countenanced racial discrimination and 
segregation.”29  Comparably, in The New Deal (1967) Paul Conkin said, “The story of the New 
Deal is a sad story, the ever-recurring story of what might have been.”30 William Appleman 
Williams, Schlesinger’s intellectual rival, covered the intellectual dimensions of the New Deal in 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 392.  
29 Barton J. Bernstein, “The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform,” in 
Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1968), 264. 
30 Paul Conkin, The New Deal (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1967), 54. 
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The Contours of American History.  For Williams, the New Deal did not usher in a revolution, 
but merely continued the Hoover administration’s corporatism.31   
 The most extreme author among the New Left scholarship was Marxist historian Ronald 
Radosh.  Where Conkin based his denouncements on the New Deal’s liberal failures, Radosh 
based his argument on a perceived conservatism within the New Deal. Economically, he argued, 
“It’s special form of conservatism was the development of reforms that modernized corporate 
capitalism and brought corporate law to reflect the system’s changed nature.”32  To support his 
claim, he noted the reactionary elements of each major New Deal policy.  Social Security’s 
benefits “helped maintain the existing system of production and distribution.”33  Public works 
programs like the Public Works Administration and the Works Progress Administration were “of 
a limited nature and did not interfere with private business prerogatives.”34  The Wagner Act’s 
structure “allowed the administration to obtain the final integration of organized labor into the 
existing political economy of corporation capitalism.”35 In his conclusion, Radosh delineated 
from New Deal history to espouse his own political views. He bemoaned, “Understanding how 
the New Deal worked will enable us to resist policies based on further extensions of the Welfare 
State, and to commit ourselves instead to the collective effort to forge a socialist community in 
America.”36 
                                                 
31 William Appleman Williams, The Contours of American History (Chicago, Illinois: 
Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1961), 439-451.  
32 Ronald Radosh, “The Myth of the New Deal,” in Ronald Radosh and Murray N. Rothbard, ed., 
A New History of Leviathan: Essays on the Rise of the American Corporate State (New York: 
E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1972),  
33 Ibid., 159. 
34 Ibid., 170. 
35 Ibid., 173. 
36 Ibid., 187.  
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 Radosh’s article exemplified the critical problems with the entire New Left historical 
school.  Ironically, famed New Left historian Howard Zinn described this problem with his 
school.  Historians, in his view, were to subject the past to modern criticisms.  “It is for today,” 
he wrote, “that we turn to the think of the New Deal period.”37  Like Radosh, Zinn discredited 
the New Deal for not bringing “the blessings of immense natural wealth and staggering 
productive potential to every person in the land” or teaching ordinary people “how to 
communicate the day-to-day pains felt, between emergencies.”38  Rebuking New Left arguments, 
Jerold S. Auerbach asserted, “The New Left critique of the New Deal—spirited, controversial, 
and provocative though it may be—is occasionally illogical and consistently ahistorical.”39  In 
the stream of New Deal historiography, the New Left’s contribution was that it contested the 
consensus historians’ assumption that the New Deal radically altered the nation based on liberal 
principles and that it questioned the notion that the New Deal was the driving force behind the 
economic rehabilitation.  
The New Left school declined as the social movements of the 1960s faded.  In the 1970s 
and the 1980s, New Deal scholarship adopted a new, more diverse form.  Whereas earlier 
scholarship viewed the program from a top-down approach, these new studies dissected 
individual programs and their impacts upon various social groups.  “This emergent consensus 
has not, however, so much ended controversy over the New Deal as transformed the terms of the 
debate,” John Braeman wrote, “The more recent monographic literature on the New Deal, while 
admitting its limited aims and even more limited successes, puts the New Deal in juster 
                                                 
37 Howard Zinn, The Politics of History (Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1970). 
Zinn dedicated an entire book to this subject in Howard Zinn, ed., New Deal Thought (New 
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).  
38 Zinn, The Politics of History, 119. 
39 Jerold S. Auerbach, “New Deal, Old Deal, or Raw Deal: Some Thoughts on New Left 
Historiography,” Journal of Southern History 35 (Feb.1969), 27.  
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perspective by showing its positive achievements in humanizing and disciplining American 
capitalism, the novelty and complexity of the problems that the Roosevelt administration faced, 
the difficulties of shaping policy in a pluralistic democracy, the continuing appeal of traditional 
values and attitudes, and the strength—diminished, but not destroyed—of private interest 
groups.”40  Furthermore, historians incorporated disciplines such as sociology and anthropology 
into these accounts.41 
During this time, James T. Patterson’s work illustrated the political complications during 
the New Deal period.  In The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition (1969), 
Patterson confronted United States historians’ bias to focus solely on the federal government.  
He contended that the federal government did not uniformly impose its agenda on receptive state 
governments.  Instead, state actors contested these programs and impacted the success they 
achieved on the state level.  Nonetheless, this period still witnessed a transition towards top-
down governance that marked federalism until the 1980s.  “Compared to the national 
government, the states lost authority in the 1930s—and they have regained very little since.  But 
their loss was not the fault of Roosevelt, [Harry] Hopkins, or [James] Farley, or the most 
nationalistic ideologues of the New Deal,” he wrote, “They have slipped—relatively—because 
the states alone, for good or ill, lacked the potential to solve the problems of urban, mid-
                                                 
40 John Braeman, “The New Deal and the ‘Broker State:” A Review of the Recent Scholarly 
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twentieth century America.”42  Similarly, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The 
Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939 (1967) emphasized the role the 
conservative opposition played in bringing the New Deal to a close.43 
 As the gap between the New Deal and the present widened, historians who did compose 
general histories gave the policies a balanced approached.  The most recent—and arguably most 
objective—examination of the New Deal was David M. Kennedy’s Freedom From Fear: The 
American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (1999).44  Where early liberal 
interpretations hailed nearly all New Deal programs as instant successes and New Left historians 
condemned the New Deal for merely preserving the existing capitalist structure, Kennedy 
recognized the New Deal’s successes and failures.  The New Deal did not stabilize the national 
economy as original historians thought, it only prevented further damage.  Full economic return 
did not occur until the United States entered World War II.  “When the war brought recovery at 
last, a recovery that inaugurated the most prosperous quarter century America has ever know, it 
brought it to an economy and a country that the New Deal had fundamentally altered.”45  With 
this in mind, the New Deal’s true achievement was not economic recovery.  Kennedy argued, 
“Above all, the New Deal gave to countless Americans who had never had much of it a sense of 
security, and with it a sense of having a stake in their country.  And it did it all without shredding 
the American Constitution or sundering the American people.  At a time when despair and 
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alienation were prostrating other peoples under the heel of dictatorship, that was no small 
accomplishment.”46 
During the administration of President William Clinton in the 1990s, scholars perceived 
this presidency as a revival in liberalism.  Historians in this context used this opportunity to 
examine the past through the context of liberal development.  Alan Brinkley viewed the New 
Deal’s impact on this ideological strand in American history.  Beginning his analysis in 1937 
with the onset of a second economic downturn in the country—which some called the 
“Roosevelt recession,” Brinkley argued this event allowed liberal “New Dealers” like Tom 
Cocoran, Thurman Arnold, and Benjamin Cohen to exert influence within the administration.  
“The importance of the New Deal lies in large part, of course, in the actual legislative and 
institutional achievements: the Social Security System, the Wagner Act, the TVA, the farm 
subsidy programs, the regulation of wages and hours . . . and others—achievements that together 
transformed the federal government and its relationship to the economy and to the American 
people,” wrote Brinkley, “But the New Deal’s significance lies as will in its impact on 
subsequent generations of liberals and, through them, on two decades of postwar government 
activism.  And in that light, the New Deal appears not just as a bright moment in which reform 
energies briefly prevailed but as part of a long process of ideological adaptation.”47  For 
Brinkley, the New Deal set the bar for liberals like Lyndon B. Johnson and Clinton later in the 
twentieth century. 
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Likewise, Alonzo L. Hamby’s ideological study recognized the New Deal’s overall 
failure to mend the national economy.48  “Although he failed to achieve many of his most 
important immediate objectives, although he was notoriously eclectic and nonsystematic in his 
approach to the enormous problems of his era, FDR was the founder of a distinctly new tradition 
which was to preempt the mainstream of American politics after his death.”49  Theodore 
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson’s progressivism influenced this new tradition and its dedication 
to securing individual liberty through federal intervention.  Hamby reasoned that this tradition 
continued into the twentieth century until President Ronald Reagan warned, “Government is not 
the solution to our problem.  Government is the problem.”  In this sense, Reagan was the 
“Roosevelt of the right.”50 
 Recently scholarship began to place the New Deal and its key participants in an 
international context.  In his award-winning work, Ira Katznelson extended his parameters past 
the traditionally viewed New Deal end date of 1943 to the end of the Truman administration in 
1950.  Similar to Kennedy’s emphasis on security, Katznelson emphasized the role of fear in 
New Deal politics.  Nothing guaranteed that the United States would recover after the Great 
Depression.  This crisis made Americans uncertain about their futures; some even questioned 
whether the liberal democracy enshrined in the Constitution could recover without drastic 
measures.  This unpredictability correlated with the rise of fascism and dictatorship abroad.  In 
context, Roosevelt’s drastic increase of federal power resembled those taken in 1930s Germany 
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and Italy.51  Likewise, David Roll’s The Hopkins Touch (2013) examined the role Works 
Progress Administrator Harry Hopkins played domestically as both a works relief administrator 
and internationally as a diplomat.52 
 Interestingly, the late-twentieth century and early twenty-first century ushered in a new 
body of New Deal literature geared towards general audiences.  In biographies, Jean Edward 
Smith’s FDR (2005) and Kenneth S. Davis’ multi-volume series exemplified this trend.  
Appealing to a larger, less educated audience, these texts provided only cursory accounts of the 
New Deal period; some even bordered on hagiography, ignoring Roosevelt’s extramarital affair 
and attributing the entire success of the New Deal to the president.53 
 In summary, the historical context in which authors wrote about the New Deal shaped 
how they wrote about it.  The individuals who served in the Roosevelt administration wrote 
favorable accounts of the agenda they helped devise and implement.  Consensus historians 
examined unity as the driving force behind the New Deal.  Those in the 1960s New Left 
historians criticized the New Deal for failing to attain the achievements contemporary social 
movements sought to bring about.  Finally, late-twentieth century historians approached the New 
Deal from bottom-up and international perspectives.   
B. The Constitutional and Legal History of the New Deal 
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“Work in legal history has tended to focus too much on courts, and with unfortunate 
limitations even within that range,” lamented legal historian James Willard Hurst.54  This 
description applied to New Deal history up to the twenty-first century.  The New Deal’s limited 
legal history almost exclusively focused on Supreme Court litigation invalidating key statutes 
and the subsequent constitutional crisis that ensued after President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
introduced his court-packing bill in 1937.  This thesis seeks to extend the scope of New Deal 
legal history past the Court to include a legislative act passed in direct response to the 
bureaucratic growth of the early 1930s.  
Within New Deal constitutional and legal historiography, numerous texts cover the 
“constitutional revolution” that occurred during the Roosevelt administration.  William E. 
Leuchtenburg’s The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of 
Roosevelt (1996) provided the traditional narrative for the “constitutional revolution.”55  Once 
President Roosevelt had implemented New Deal policies geared towards recovering and 
reforming the national economy, the Supreme Court reviewed this legislation.  From 1935 to 
1937, the Court invalidated key pieces of the New Deal.  Through Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 
(1935) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935), the Court overturned the 
National Recovery Administration as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.56  In 
United States v. Butler (1936) the Court invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment 
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Administration’s processing tax for violating the Tenth Amendment.57  Roosevelt claimed the 
Court subjected the nation to a “horse and buggy” interpretation of interstate commerce that 
hampered federal involvement.  Using his electoral mandate after the Democratic Party’s sweep 
in the 1936 elections, Roosevelt introduced a bill to increase the number of justices on the 
Supreme Court.  This opportunity would allow him to “pack” the Court with justices predisposed 
to rule in favor of his policies. 
Even though Congress rejected the “court-packing” bill, the intended effect still occurred.  
Beginning in 1937, the Court’s rulings on New Deal legislation ruled in the administration’s 
favor.  West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) first signified the Court’s new jurisprudence.58 In 
Parrish, the Court overturned precedents set in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) and 
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo (1936) by upholding minimum wage legislation in 
Washington.59  In Helvering v. Davis (1937) and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937), the 
Court sustained the Social Security Act of 1935.60  Finally, National Labor Relations Board v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937) upheld the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 
and solidified labor’s right to collectively organize.61  After 1937, the Court ruled in favor of 
every New Deal policy.  
Leuchtenburg attributed this revolutionary transformation to either the “court-packing” 
bill’s constitutional implications—meaning an infringement on the Constitution’s separation-of-
powers system—or Roosevelt’s mandate in the 1936 election.  Specifically, this conventional 
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narrative looked at the voting behaviors of Justice Owen J. Roberts and Chief Justice Charles 
Evan Hughes.  Once Roosevelt introduced the bill, these moderate justices had no choice but to 
rule with the liberal bloc of the Court in order to sustain institutional integrity.62  The fear that 
Roosevelt’s bill jeopardized the Court’s independence drove them to carry out this swift 
response; this quick break from precedent led historians like Leuchtenburg to label the 
transformation a “revolution.” 
  Other scholars questioned this theory.  In his study of antebellum American law, Morton 
J. Horwitz wrote, “Constitutional law in America represents episodic legal intervention 
buttressed by rhetorical tradition that is often an unreliable guide to the slower (and often more 
unconscious) process of legal change in America.”63  His assessment proved equally applicable 
to constitutional changes in the New Deal era.  In recent years, legal historians revisited the 
“constitutional revolution” and the conventional narrative that Roosevelt’s “court-packing” plan 
ushered in this transformation.  Two histories, Barry Cushman’s Rethinking the New Deal Court: 
The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (1999) and G. Edward White’s The Constitution 
and the New Deal (2000), gave the revolution a more realistic approach. 64 
First, Cushman’s Rethinking the New Deal Court began with a rejection of the 
conventional narrative.  Using primary sources, he deduced that the “court-packing” bill could 
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not have caused the “constitutional revolution.”  In reality, the Court decided Parrish, arguably 
the seminal case in the “constitutional revolution,” at the end of their 1936 session; they delayed 
the case to the following year because Justice Harlan Fiske Stone was ill.  Additionally, this 
author argued that it was unlikely that Roosevelt’s 1936 mandate pressured the Court to change 
because he had already possessed this authority after the 1934 congressional elections. 
 Cushman’s analysis continued by establishing a different hypothesis for the 
“constitutional revolution.”  For Cushman, the jurisprudential transformation belonged in the 
larger conversation about government regulation and interstate commerce.  In his argument, the 
1934 case Nebbia v. New York represented a shift in constitutional jurisprudence that predated 
the “court-packing” bill.65  In Nebbia, the Court abandoned the “public-private” distinction it had 
long employed to determine regulatory commerce clause cases.  From here, the Court rejected 
the NRA and AAA because they were poorly-written.  After 1937, when the Court upheld New 
Deal legislation, they did so because it better fit constitutional precedent.  Therefore, the justices 
were not responding to the “court-packing” bill, they were deciding cases based on what best fit 
precedent.  Likewise, the Court did not fully transform until Roosevelt nominated his own 
appointees.  This “Roosevelt Court” further extended commerce clause case law in United States 
v. Darby (1941), which allowed Congress to outlaw child labor, and Wickard v. Filburn (1942), 
which allowed Congress to regulate commerce even when it lay outside interstate commerce.66 
Comparatively, White’s The Constitution and the New Deal expanded Cushman’s scope 
and compared this supposed constitutional revolution to larger shifts in legal history.  Assessing 
developments in foreign relations, civil liberties, and administrative law, White argued that the 
constitutional and legal changes that occurred under the New Deal belonged to a larger part of 
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jurisprudential shifts.  His study argued, “The crisis was underway by the early 1920s and not 
fully resolved until after the Second World War, so neither its surfacing nor its resolution can be 
attributed solely to developments in the New Deal period.”67  His overarching thesis was that 
future historians should “cabin” the New Deal in its own time because these constitutional and 
legal changes did not begin or end with the New Deal. 
 Appeasing Hurst’s qualm that legal history too often examines Supreme Court cases and 
justices only, Peter Irons’ The New Deal Lawyers (1982) investigated the lawyers who staffed 
the New Deal agencies and defended these policies in the courtroom.68  Narrowing his research 
down to three agencies, the National Recovery Administration, the Agricultural Adjustment 
Agency, and the National Labor Relations Board, Irons identified three distinct litigation 
strategies that shaped how these programs fared before the Supreme Court.  Executive branch 
conflict, poorly-trained lawyers, and clashing political interests hindered the NRA’s “Legal 
Politicians.”  These setbacks prevented them from finding a workable litigation strategy, and 
eventually caused them to select a weak test case to take to the Court.  Lofty goals limited the 
AAA’s “Legal Reformers.”  Jerome Frank and his counsel desired to use their position to assist 
poor tenant farmers and sharecroppers in the South.  Their ambition led to their defeat as they 
overextended their roles and failed to select a test case that matched administration’s interests. 
Irons praised the “Legal Craftsmen” of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).  As the 
name implied, these lawyers, trained in Ivy League schools, meticulously drafted and 
implemented the Wagner Act.  To verify the act’s constitutionality in Court, they finely selected 
five test cases that supported their argument.  These combined efforts led the Court to uphold all 
aspects of the NLRB.  Conclusively, Irons argued that the conflicts in the NRA and AAA 
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resulted in poorly-written law.  Focusing less on the constitutional “revolution” explanation, 
Irons attributed the Court’s switch to this “poor craftsmen” theory.” 
 Whether or not the “constitutional revolution” occurred because of the “court-packing” 
bill or a shift in legal jurisprudence, these accounts share similar features.  Even when legal 
historians like Irons departed from the orthodoxy of court histories, their analysis still focused on 
the “constitutional revolution” of 1937.  Though Irons examined a legal actor other than judges, 
his works still remained in the courtroom.  With this literature in mind, this thesis seeks to 
examine a federal law, the Hatch Act of 1939, that resulted because of the New Deal’s expansive 
administrative growth. 
C. Hatch Act Historiography 
 In his biographical sketch of New Mexico Senator Carl Hatch (D), historian David Porter 
stated, “Surprisingly, historians have not devoted entire works or many chapters to the original 
Hatch Act.”69  When New Deal historians wrote about the Hatch Act, usually, they only granted 
it a few lines when discussing possible political interference in the 1938 midterm elections.  This 
thesis seeks to amend this problem by connecting the Hatch Act with constitutional context of 
the New Deal era. 
The bulk of literature pertaining to the Hatch Act of 1939 comes from law reviews.  
Generally, these pieces are similarly structured in that they begin with a brief history of the act’s 
passage and then discuss its constitutionality.70 Much of Hatch Act scholarship arose during the 
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1970s either before or after the Court debated the constitutionality of the act in 1973.71  Bearing 
this point in mind, these authors ended their arguments by making a policy recommendation in 
regard to the Hatch Act (usually calling for the Court to overturn the law).  While these pieces 
did provide different viewpoints on the act, most lacked any relevance to historical scholarship.  
 Along these same lines, Delmer Gibson Rhodes’ M.A. thesis chronicled the Hatch Act’s 
constitutional history from its inception to the 1970s.72  This author detailed the provisions 
within the law and chronicled the federal cases that tested this law’s constitutionality.  This thesis 
suffered from the same criticism as the relevant law reviews in that it also provided a personal 
evaluation of the law, avoiding a objective assessment.  While this text would be useful in 
determining the constitutionality of the law, for historical study, it provided little.  However, this 
literature was the only text to trace the Hatch Act’s litigation history, making it a useful resource 
in this field.  
 The only monograph covering the Hatch Act of 1939 was James R. Eccles’ The Hatch 
Act and the American Bureaucracy (1981).73  First, like the other literature on this subject, this 
author imposed his opinion about the law throughout the book, suggesting it infringed upon 
governmental employees’ freedom of speech.  Second, the author failed to use many secondary 
sources in his analysis, disconnecting this text from the existing historical literature on the New 
Deal and the period’s legal changes.  
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Nevertheless, this work’s highlight was its implementation of primary sources.  From 
congressional floor debates to the committee hearings, Eccles research provided future 
investigators with a wealth of resources to expand upon the Hatch Act.  
 The most well-developed writing on the Hatch Act came from Jason Scott Smith’s 
Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works, 1933-1956 (2006).74  
Using the 1938 Democratic primary in Kentucky to investigate political corruption under New 
Deal public works agencies, Smith connected this election and others like it to the passage of the 
Hatch Act of 1939.  Where Building New Deal Liberalism fell short—and where this thesis will 
build upon—was the constitutional importance of the Hatch Act.  For Smith, the Hatch Act 
served merely as a retaliation against corruption in public works projects; he did not extend this 
hypothesis to the entire New Deal expansion.  Yet Smith’s work surpassed other Hatch Act 
literature in that it refrained from making a personal evaluation of the act.  
III. The WPA 
Throughout the Great Depression, one of the greatest challenges for government officials 
was lowering the unemployment rate and returning Americans to the workplace.  When 
Roosevelt assumed the presidency in 1933, government data estimated the unemployment rate at 
approximately 33% of the total work force in the United States.75  Aside from sedating the 
domestic economy, gross unemployment demoralized the national temperament and caused 
some to question democracy and liberal capitalism’s sustainability.76 
To rectify this joblessness, Roosevelt created work relief programs to put Americans 
back to work.  Initial agencies like the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Public Works 
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Administration were unable to tackle large-scale unemployment and large-scale construction 
projects.  On April 8, 1935, Congress appropriated nearly $5 billion to fund work relief projects 
with the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act.  Injecting new money into previous work relief 
programs like the PWA, it also supplied the financial support to create a larger national work 
relief program.  One month later, on May 6, Roosevelt signed the WPA into creation.77 
Overtime, the WPA became the largest federal work relief program implemented to 
tackle national unemployment.  Its hierarchy created an organized system for the federal 
government to approve work projects.  The program divided every state into multiple districts 
with its own WPA office (Kentucky, for example, had six districts).  Each state had its own 
administrator who oversaw office operations.  Above these officials, regional directors 
communicated with the top-level officials in the WPA.  At the top, the chief executive directed 
the entire policy for the agency; the most notable head of the WPA was Harry Hopkins.  When a 
city or state saw the need for a new construction project, the request worked its way through this 
hierarchy and bureaucracy until the federal administration approved.  Moreover, because it had 
appropriated the funds for the entire agency, Congress generated a list of acceptable options.78 
However, from its inception, the WPA attracted unwanted political attention.  Pulitzer-
Prize winning historian David M. Kennedy commented, “The WPA was from the outset a 
magnet for controversy.  It was a federal program, but one that recognized the timeworn 
principle that ‘all politics is local.’  Roosevelt used it to build up those local bosses who would, 
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in turn, support his national programs.”79  As early as 1935, opponents of the New Deal in 
Kentucky charged the WPA with political activities during election season.  During the state’s 
gubernatorial election, Republicans working for party nominee King Swope charged the WPA 
with political involvement.  Hoping to discredit Roosevelt and the New Deal, they alleged that 
the national arm of the WPA funneled forty-two million dollars into Kentucky to buy 72,000 
votes for the Democratic candidate, A.B. “Happy” Chandler.80 
At its peak in September 1938, the Kentucky WPA employed seventy-two thousand 
Kentuckians. Specific projects included an administrative office for Louisville’s Bowman Field 
airport, a new city hall in Pineville, and an improved school for Morgan County.  Across the 
state, the WPA created “sewing rooms” for local women to make clothes for needy families.  
The agency created and staffed recreation centers in nearly every county in the state.  When the 
Ohio River flooded in 1937, WPA workers helped repair the damages in downtown Louisville.81 
Famously, the WPA hired Kentucky women to traverse rural regions in Eastern Kentucky and 
lend books in a “packhorse library.”82  
Throughout the 1930s, the WPA had combated unemployment in Kentucky and across 
the nation, mitigating the effects of the Great Depression.  When Roosevelt ended the program in 
1943, the Kentucky headquarters in downtown Louisville had processed over $162 million 
spread out over thousands of projects.83  Nationally, over its eight years, it employed 8.5 million 
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people for $11 billion.84  If any agency symbolized the New Deal’s unprecedented governmental 
expansion, it was the WPA.   
IV. The 1938 Kentucky Democratic Primary Scandal 
In hindsight, 1938 marked a transitional period for both the world and the United States.  
In January, the Sino-Japanese conflict witnessed one of its bloodiest incidents with the Nanking 
Massacre under Emperor Hirohito.  On March 12, Adolf Hitler’s Germany annexed neighboring 
Austria in the Anschluss.  Elsewhere, the Italian fascists under Benito Mussolini continued to 
wage war in Ethiopia.  Across the globe, totalitarian states expanded their boundaries and 
asserted international dominance.  Nearly a year later, this aggression led to the start of World 
War II when Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. 
In the United States, by 1938, support for the New Deal among the public and in 
Congress waned.  Two political issues the previous year compromised President Roosevelt’s 
governing coalition.  First, a brief economic recession threatened to plunge the country back into 
the depression.  As unemployment decreased and GDP increased in early 1937, Roosevelt sought 
to balance the budget by reducing federal expenditures.  In turn, an economic relapse—dubbed 
the “Roosevelt recession”—occurred in the fall and winter.85  Second, President Roosevelt’s 
“court-packing” bill decreased presidential popularity. After the Supreme Court invalidated the 
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 
Roosevelt feared the conservative justices on the Court restricted the nation to a “horse-and-
buggy” definition of the commerce clause.  Using the electoral mandate he achieved in the 1936 
election, Roosevelt revealed a judiciary bill allowing the president to appoint six new justices to 
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the Supreme Court (using their old age as justification).  The American public and congressional 
members from both parties recognized this bill as a response to previous anti-New Deal 
decisions and a potential risk to the constitutional system of checks and balances.86 
 It was in this historical context, with an executive branch in control of an expanded relief 
system that was declining in popularity, that the 1938 Kentucky Democratic Primary occurred.  
Two factors attracted national attention to this party primary race.  First, the candidates were two 
key figures in Kentucky state politics.  The 1938 Democratic primary pitted Senate Majority 
Leader Alben W. Barkley against Govern A.B. “Happy” Chandler.  Second, the claims of 
political corruption heightened anti-government sentiment.  Both sides hurled accusations that 
the other utilized government workers and funds to sway the elections.  This essay recounts both 
politicians’ backstories and then delves into the rumors of political corruption. 
 Born in Graves County, Kentucky, Alben William Barkley became the Kentucky Senator 
most closely associated with the New Deal and the Roosevelt administration.  Spanning nearly 
five decades, his political career ranges from local offices to the vice-presidency. After 
completing his legal education at the University of Virginia, Barkley’s first venture into local 
Kentucky politics occurred when he ran to become McCracken County’s county attorney in 
1904. Winning this election, he went on to become the county judge in 1909. Three years later, 
in 1912, he first entered Congress as the Representative for Kentucky’s First District.  There, he 
became a proponent of President Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom, advocating for increased 
restrictions on monopolies and government regulation of the market.  Gaining popularity in the 
House, he became a candidate in Kentucky’s 1923 gubernatorial Democratic primary.  Losing 
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the nomination to James Campbell Cantrill, he increased his standing in the party by backing this 
ticket in the general election.  Retaining his seat in the House, Barkley transitioned to the Senate 
in 1926.  As a harsh critic of President Herbert Hoover’s approach to the economic depression, 
Barkley used his popularity to campaign for Roosevelt during his presidential campaign in 1932.  
Roosevelt awarded this association by endorsing Barkley for Senate Majority Leader 1936 when 
the incumbent, Joseph Robinson, passed away.  Across all of these positions, Barkley employed 
the oratory skills he had developed as a schoolchild to enunciate on his ideological positions.87 
 Barkley’s rival, Albert Benjamin “Happy” Chandler, also possessed an extensive record 
in Kentucky state politics before and after the 1938 primary.  A Henderson County native, his 
peers at Transylvania University gave him his nickname, “Happy,” for his outgoing and 
energetic personality.88  Beginning in the Lexington political scene, he became a state senator 
from Woodford County in 1929.  By the age of thirty-seven, he had served as a state senator, 
lieutenant governor, and governor; later, he went on to serve as a United States senator, a second 
term as governor, and baseball commissioner.  In 1935, Chandler defeated Thomas Rhea in the 
Democratic gubernatorial primary. In the subsequent general election, Chandler partook in the 
national Democratic sweep as he trounced Republican candidate King Swope.  During his 
tenure, he replaced the two-primary system with a single primary system, abolished the sales tax 
implemented by former Governor Ruby Laffoon, and increased liquor and cigarette taxes.89 
For these two Kentucky political giants, the 1938 Democratic primary became the race of 
a lifetime.  Recounting his political career in his autobiography, Barkley described the 1938 
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primary as “the only year in which I had serious opposition for renomination.”90  Similarly, in an 
interview later in his life, Chandler relayed his perception of the primary.  He envisioned his 
1938 campaign as a battle against Barkley, Roosevelt, and the federal treasury.  Chandler 
described his relationship with Roosevelt, “I never got along well with Roosevelt. He did some 
good things, but he did some bad things too.”91   
Given Chandler’s quick ascension in Kentucky politics, Barkley feared Chandler would 
challenge him in his 1938 reelection.  Chandler confirmed these suspicions on January 22, 1938, 
when he refused to attend a testimonial dinner celebrating Barkley’s promotion to Senate 
Majority Leader.  Moreover, Chandler held his own function on the same date, inviting 
government officials from across the state.92  He announced his Senate bid on February 23 in 
Newport, Kentucky.  Touting his own state record, he offered himself as a “man of action to 
replace a man of words.”  In his speech, he played upon Barkley’s connection to Roosevelt and 
claimed the Senator had given Kentucky the “absent treatment.”  Urging Kentuckians to stand by 
him one more time, Chandler was “absolutely certain of victory.”93  
 The corruption scandal began in the summer in late May 1938.  On May 27, Brady 
Stewart, Chandler’s campaign manager, published a letter claiming that “every federal relief 
agency in Kentucky is frankly and brazenly operating on a political basis.”  George Goodman, 
Kentucky WPA director, rebuked these accusations in the Courier Journal.  One particular 
rumor alleged that the WPA distributed groceries and commodities to needy Kentuckians in 
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paper bags inscribed “donated by a friend of Senator Alben W. Barkley.”  The campaign 
defended that these items came from an unnamed benefactor outside the administration.94  On 
June 29, Hopkins released the results of an internal WPA investigation in Kentucky.  Finding 
twenty-two alleged instances of political activities in the state, Hopkins rebutted all but two.  But 
after the election, Ernest Rowe, the former WPA supervisor for the Lexington district, leaked 
correspondence purporting that George Goodman pressured Kentucky agency officials to 
contribute funds to Barkley’s campaign.95  Goodman provided no comment on these 
allegations.96 
 Chandler employed similar tactics using state government employees.  With the help of 
campaign official Dan Talbott, Chandler’s patronage rested primarily on the state highway 
program.  During the primary, he increased hirings to gain more votes.  The agency also 
dispatched letters promising “to build roads where they are appreciated and where we can 
accommodate those who are loyal, tried, and true.”  Similarly, the Chandler campaign used state 
workers to deliver old age pension checks to elderly Kentuckians, in some cases refusing to grant 
the check if they refused to vote for the governor.97 
 On July 8, 1938, in the midst of campaigning, Roosevelt traveled to Kentucky. At his 
first stop in Covington, the president rebutted the claims against federal corruption by recounting 
the New Deal’s numerous successes.98  Citing new federal expenditures, matched traditional 
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funds for state projects, avoiding mass liquidation through the Home Owners Loan Corporation 
and the Farm Credit Administration, and federal assistance against flood damages, he argued that 
New Deal policies had a direct, positive impact on Kentuckians.  Roosevelt alleged, “If the 
Federal Government, your government, had not done at least some of these things, the state 
governments would probably not have done them at all out of their own resources, because they 
could not.”99  After this claim, he then proceeded to discuss the upcoming state primary. “I read 
in the papers that you are having a primary campaign in Kentucky,” he noted, “Both candidates I 
know.  Both are men of ability.  Both are representative Kentuckians. I want to make it definite 
and clear to you that I am not interfering in any shape, manner or form in the primary campaign 
in Kentucky.  I do not live here—you do.”  Minutes later, he contradicted this position by 
attesting to Barkley’s experience. “I have no doubt whatsoever that Governor Chandler would 
make a good Senator from Kentucky—but I think that my friend, the Governor, would be the 
first to acknowledge . . . it would take many years to match the national knowledge, the 
experience, and acknowledged leadership in the affairs of the Nation of that son of Kentucky, of 
whom the whole nation is proud, Alben Barkley.”100  During this part, Chandler, according to 
Barkley, smiled, waved, and called out to the crowd to distract them from Roosevelt’s 
endorsement.101 
In conclusion, he dismissed the claims that state and federal government officials utilized 
their positions and resources to persuade voters. He stated:  
You have heard charges and the country has heard charges of the use of political 
influence exerted on primary voters. Charges have been bandied back and forth that 
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employees of the Federal Government and workers on relief are being directed how to 
vote. And we have all heard charges that state employees, people the state payroll and 
their friends are being directed how to vote. Let me assure you that it is contrary to direct 
and forceful orders from Washington, for any Federal Government employee to tell those 
under them how to vote and I trust that the same rule applies to those who work for or 
under the State of Kentucky. 
Personally, I am not greatly disturbed by these stories because I have an old-
fashioned idea, an old-fashioned faith, that the voters of Kentucky, no matter whom they 
employ or by whom they are employed, are going to voter their own personal convictions 
on Primary Day. That is as it should be. 
 
However, later that same day, Roosevelt adopted a much more direct stance for whom 
Kentucky voters should cast their ballots.  In Louisville, the president praised the city’s resilience 
in recovering from flooding along the Ohio River the previous year, saying, “I want to 
congratulate you and also the citizens of other communities who suffered so greatly from that 
flood on the firm courage and the fine spirit with which you met that disaster.”102  To further 
ameliorate this damage, he pledged future federal assistance from executive agencies like the 
WPA, Public Health Service, and Army Engineers.  Aside from this promise, Roosevelt 
concluded these remarks with an appeal to his favored candidate.  He continued, “In this work of 
planning and coordinating work on a vast scale, I want to acknowledge the splendid assistance I 
have received from the senior Senator from Kentucky,” he praised, “This is a national problem. 
We need people of national experience with a national point of work to carry it out.”103 
Roosevelt’s endorsement of Barkley belonged to a larger historical trend that occurred in 
Democratic primaries across the country.  Seeking to purge the Democratic Party of conservative 
legislators hostile to the New Deal, the president endorsed and assisted candidates who sided 
with him ideologically.  In South Carolina, he allowed Governor Olin Johnston to announce 
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against conservative incumbent Senator Ellison “Cotton Ed” Smith on the White House steps.  
At a public rally in Georgia, he challenged Senator Walter F. George by stating that—if 
possible—he would “most assuredly” cast his vote for pro-New Deal challenger Lawrence 
Camp. Likewise, he endorsed Maryland candidate Representative David J. Lewis against Senator 
Millard Tydings, claiming the incumbent had “betrayed the New Deal in the past and will 
again.”104  This purge proved unsuccessful as all of the conservative Democratic incumbents 
defeated the challengers Roosevelt had endorsed.  
Despite his insistence to campaign on behalf of political candidates, it is unknown if 
Roosevelt or members of his executive cabinet knew about these actions.  Robert E. Sherwood, 
one of Roosevelt’s speechwriters, described Harry Hopkins response to the Kentucky 
controversy.  “Just as post-office employees had been used time immemorial to beat the bushes 
in behalf of the ‘right’ candidates, so it was inevitable that local politicians all over the country 
would find ways and means of taking advantage of the vast WPA organizations,” Sherwood 
wrote, “Hopkins hated these activities, but he most certainly knew about them and made only 
occasional attempts to stop them, and to that extent he was culpable.”105  In his autobiography, 
James A. Farley,  Roosevelt’s 1932 campaign manager and later Chairman of the Democratic 
National Convention, also addressed these claims: “It seems to me that the administration of 
WPA and PWA has been remarkably free from the blight of partisanship and politics.  It would 
be idle to deny that overzealous individuals in some communities have tried to obtain partisan 
advantage out of relief activities, but that is a far cry from endeavoring to prove that the entire 
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Federal set-up has been shot through with corruption and favoritism.”  Moreover, he further 
defended Hopkins and the WPA by attesting that he has “never been identified with Democratic 
politics” and that agency’s social workers “by long training and environment are hostile to 
political control of any kind.”106 
In the final count, Barkley defeated Chandler by over seventy thousand votes.107  
“Barkley’s victory stemmed from his popularity among three crucial voting blocs—farmers, 
laborers and city dwellers—rather than from political coercion,” argued historian Walter L. 
Hixson.  His victory came from “the enduring popularity of the New Deal” and the “hundreds of 
grateful constituents” he had helped during his previous times in office.108   
Months later in the general election, Barkley defeated Republican candidate John P. 
Haswell.  Though the New Deal retained an ally with Barkley’s victory, it did not fare so well it 
other elections. In the House, Republican numbers nearly doubled from 89 members to 169. 
Furthermore, by historian James T. Patterson’s calculations, out of the 260 returning 
congressional Democrats, 30 outright opposed the New Deal and 50 more were unenthusiastic.109  
Examining this ideological purge in conjunction with growing anti-New Deal sentiment 
demonstrated that Roosevelt faced a legislative branch that disfavored the growing executive 
branch.  This bloc of conservative Democrats and Republicans in Congress provided the support 
needed to pass the Hatch Act later. 
Whether or not Barkley, Chandler, or Roosevelt utilized their governmental positions to 
influence the turnout of the election is unknown, though the evidence suggests both campaigns 
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did.110  Moreover, when Senator M. M. Logan passed away the following year, Chandler 
resigned the governorship and Keen Johnson, his successor, appointed him to the vacant Senate 
seat.111 But the 1938 Senate election’s impact and importance extended beyond its electoral 
outcomes.  Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter Thomas L. Stokes recounted, “I travelled through the 
length and breadth of the state, talking to politicians on both sides, WPA directors, WPA 
workers, state officials and employees . . . I reported what I had found, which was that the WPA 
was in deep politics on behalf of Senator Barkley and that Chandler’s state political leaders were 
using state employees in every possible way and levying upon their salaries.”112 For Stokes, “a 
much bigger and broader question was involved here than the mere election of a United States 
Senator.”113 
With Roosevelt’s popularity in decline in 1938, the 1938 Kentucky Democratic primary 
was a referendum on the New Deal.  The chance that Barkley, Roosevelt’s close ally and Senate 
Majority Leader, could lose his seat drew national attention to the race.  When Chandler accused 
his campaign of employing WPA resources to influence the election, the entire United States 
watched.  Stokes’ reporting reinforced these accusations and broadcasted Barkley and Chandler’s 
pernicious political activities to the entire country.  The corruption charges prompted Congress to 
launch a national investigation into executive interference into state elections. This inquiry 
culminated in the 1939 Hatch Act, a law that restricted federal executive employees’ 
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involvement in political campaigns. Ultimately, this legislation served as the true constitutional 
and legal importance of the 1938 Kentucky Democratic primary.  
V. The Sheppard Committee 
 On May 27, 1938, the Senate adopted Senate Resolution 283 which authorized the 
Special Committee to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Expenditures and Use of Governmental 
Funds.  This resolution authorized the committee to investigate campaign expenditures for 
Senate candidates of both parties, the persons or corporations making the contributions, the 
method of the campaign expenditures, and all facts related to the promise or patronage of 
political funds.  Later, on June 16, Senate Resolution 290 enlarged the committee’s authority to 
investigate whether a federal or state appropriation had been used to influence votes in primaries 
or general elections.  Vice President John Nance Garner appointed Senator Morris Sheppard (D-
TX) to head the investigation, dubbing the body the “Sheppard Committee.”  Other members of 
the committee included Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney (D-WY), Senator David I. Walsh (D-
MA), Senator Pat Harrison (D-MS), and Senator Wallace H. White, Jr. (R-ME).114 
 At the first committee meeting, the members established a statement of intent.  “The 
objective is simple and clear—the maintenance of the integrity of the elective processes, the 
preservation of democracy at its most vital point—the ballot box, the free exercise of the voting 
franchise, and to that end the prevention of any improper use of money and of any coercion or 
intimidation by any person, group, or agency, outside or inside the Government,” they 
declared.115  
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Over the course of its existence, the committee heard hundreds of complaints related to 
political activity resulting in 119 field investigations across the country. Out of these 
investigations, six were in Kentucky. The investigation inspected claims against both campaigns. 
Though they found neither candidate culpable for the involvement, they did discover that 
political corruption did occur during the primary.  Addressing nearly twenty charges in 
Kentucky, the report read, “These activities, so far as solicitations were concerned, were carried 
on mainly by private parties, not connected with WPA, but in some instances by WPA 
officials.”116  For Barkley, they charged, “The Committee has found nothing to show that 
Senator Barkley had any knowledge of any activity by persons soliciting contributions from 
Federal employees in his behalf, or of political activity within the ranks of WPA personnel in his 
interests.  The Committee finds, therefore, no ground upon which to recommend any challenge 
to the right of Senator Barkley to the Senate seat to which he has been elected.”117  Likewise, 
with Chandler, the committee found inappropriate behavior, but did not link these irregularities 
to the candidate himself.  “The Committee also finds that State employees, whose salaries were 
derived in part from United States Treasury funds, were solicited for contributions in behalf of 
Candidate Chandler, and that this solicitation was done in such a manner as to amount to 
intimidation and coercion,” they alleged, “The evidence before the Committee fails to show that 
Governor Chandler had any knowledge of this activity.”118   
Though the committee’s report exonerated both Barkley and Chandler personally, their 
campaigns were not spared.  Comparing the Senate report to his own findings, Stokes noted, 
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“The final report revealed a far more extensive political use of WPA than I had disclosed, 
including collection of several thousand dollars from WPA employees, and it showed that the 
Chandler forces had collected some $70,000 from state-highway employees of federal and joint 
federal-state agencies.”119  From the newspapers to Congress, the general sentiment held that 
foul play had tainted the 1938 Kentucky Democratic Primary. 
Furthermore, the Sheppard Committee’s investigation revealed similar instances of 
political activity in other electoral contests across the country.  In Pennsylvania, Democratic 
Senator Joseph Guffey utilized WPA resources to back candidates for the state’s senatorial and 
gubernatorial primaries.  While the Sheppard Committee connected no corruption charges to 
Guffey, they discovered numerous cases where WPA workers solicited funds for these 
Democratic candidates.120  Similarly, Tennessee political boss Edward H. Crump and Senator 
Kenneth McKellar also used WPA funds to buy votes, but the Sheppard Committee found no 
substantive proof of these accusations.121  
Later in the committee’s report, the senators made a legislative recommendation to 
prevent future political corruption in elections.  “The committee recommends legislation 
prohibiting contributions for any political purpose whatsoever by any person who is the 
beneficiary of Federal relief funds or who is engaged in the administration of relief laws of the 
Federal Government,” they prescribed, “The committee also recommends legislation prohibiting 
any person engaged in the administration of Federal relief laws from using his official authority 
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or influence to coerce the political action of any person or body.”122  The following year, the 
Hatch Act of 1939 fulfilled this suggestion.  
VI. The Hatch Act’s Passage 
On January 5, 1939, the same day Roosevelt delivered his annual budget message, he 
gave a separate message to Congress emphasizing the WPA’s specific financial needs.  Stressing 
that foreign affairs and a recent hurricane in New England had increased demand for WPA 
projects, the president claimed that “the funds now available are barely sufficient to finance the 
Works Progress Administration through the month of January.”123  Along with this appropriation 
request, Roosevelt recognized the growing fear that the administration used WPA funds for 
political manipulation.  To address these concerns, Roosevelt urged Congress to “make this 
question the subject of study and hearings,” but Congress should not transfer WPA oversight and 
control to local governmental boards. “It is my belief that improper political practices can be 
eliminated only by the imposition of rigid statutory regulations and penalties by the Congress,” 
he proclaimed, “Such penalties should be imposed not only upon persons within the 
administrative organization of the Works Progress Administration, but also upon outsiders who 
in fact in many instances been the principal offenders in this regard.”  He closed this message 
with a concession that any rules imposed on WPA workers should not deprive them of the “civil 
rights to which they are entitled in common with other citizens.” 124 
The Hatch Act was the legislative response crafted in response to the Sheppard 
Committee’s findings.  The law derived its name from Senator Carl Hatch, a Democrat from 
New Mexico.  Hatch’s home state had faced political corruption throughout the 1930s.  In 
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October 1938, the month prior to the general elections, an Albuquerque investigation found that 
seventy-three WPA employees had engaged in political activities.  In New Mexico, Governor 
Clyde Tingley and Senator Dennis Chavez (D-NM) maintained control of a political faction that 
dominated state politics.125  Given this political machine, it was clear that Senator Hatch had his 
own incentives for proposing his namesake bill, but the Sheppard Committee’s findings  
 On March 20, 1939, Senators Hatch, Sheppard, and Warren Austin (R-VT) introduced 
Senate bill 1871 to prevent pernicious political activities to the Senate’s Committee on Privileges 
and Elections. In this committee, the bill received numerous amendments, specifically, removing 
sections that related to governed state officials and primary elections126  Senator Tom Connally 
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person to vote as he may choose.” 
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(D-TX) asked Hatch, “Is it not true that all the provisions relating to primary elections were 
eliminated?”  Senator Hatch responded, “Unfortunately, in my opinion, that is true.”127  On the 
Senate floor, the bill passed unanimously on April 13.  Looking at the most controversial 
segment, the original section 9 (a) read:  
It shall be unlawful for any person employed in any administrative or supervisory 
capacity by an agency of the Federal Government, whose compensation, or any part 
thereof, is paid from funds authorized or appropriated by any act of Congress, to use his 
official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or of 
affecting the results thereof.  All such persons hold opinions on all political subjects, but 
they shall take no active part in political management or in political campaigns. 
 
This definition was so broad that it effectively applied to both the president and vice-president.  
Though Hatch recognized this fault, the bill continued to the House of Representative’s 
Committee on the Judiciary on April 20.128 
 The bill remained in committee until late June. According to Hatch, the members of the 
Committee on the Judiciary applauded the bill’s sentiment, but feared section 9 was too broad.  
Therefore, Hatch proposed an amendment to the bill excluding “policy-making positions,” 
meaning the president and vice-president, from the restrictions.129  He was so adamant on the 
importance of the bill that, if necessary, he would attach it as an amendment to the upcoming 
appropriation bill.  On June 26, Hatch made a radio address to his home state discussing the bill. 
After citing previous Democratic Party platforms aimed at reforming the civil service, he stated:  
We who have sponsored this bill do not hope to correct all the evils which have grown up 
over the years. We do hope to make some start toward bringing about these greatly 
needed reforms.  
In doing so no thought has been given to the effect on any particular election or 
the ambitions or hopes of any individual, and certainly not of any party. If there are those 
who profess to see any political significance or maneuvering in the bill, let me say for the 
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authors of the bill, those persons are mistaken. No such maneuvering exists. My 
coauthors, the Senator from Texas [Mr. Sheppard], a man long and favorably known in 
public life, is a loyal Democrat, devoted to the principles of his party and an ardent 
supporter in all of its campaigns. The Senator from Vermont [Mr. Austin] is a 
Republican, an honorable gentleman and a patriotic statesman. The three of us have 
sought to avoid partisan consideration; we have tried to work for what we conceive to be 
the welfare of America and her people. 
The founders of this Republic never dreamed that the spoils system would be 
fastened on the Government structure.130 
 
 When the bill left the House Committee on the Judiciary, they had removed the final 
sentence of the provision, which stipulated that federal executive employees could not involve 
themselves on political campaigns. Upon hearing this news, Senator Hatch warned, “The issue 
cannot be met by any claim of defective language, hiding behind so-called imperfections of 
language cannot excuse or justify the emasculation of the measure . . . Shall Federal employees 
be permitted to engage in political activities?  Shall they continue to control and dominate 
conventions?  This, Mr. President, is the issue.  It is definitely drawn.  If the objectives are to be 
killed, let them die honorably.  Let not faith in the purposes of section 9 be betrayed by objection 
to form of language or structure of words.”131 
 Debate on the House floor began on July 20 with House Resolution 251, which 
committed the institution to debating the bill.  Representative Claude Parsons (D-IL) attested, 
“Since this House is about to witness the demise of the political parties in this country, I think a 
quorum should be present at the embalming.”132  He then asked that a quorum be present for the 
bill’s discussion.  Once the Speaker confirmed quorum, Representative John J. Dempsey (D-
NM) affirmed the Senate’s confusion with Section 9.  He proposed an amendment to the bill, 
turning section 9 into its iteration.  This clause stipulated:  
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It shall be unlawful for any person employed in the executive branch of the Federal 
Government, or any agency or department thereof, to use his official authority or 
influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof.  
No officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government or agency or 
department thereof, shall take any active part in political management or in political 
campaigns.  All such persons shall retain the right to vote as they may choose and to 
express their opinions on all political subjects.133 
 
 Debate in the House focused exclusively on this amendment; the members all agreed on 
the bills earlier sections against coercion.  During this debate, representatives on both sides of the 
issue supported their positions with a number of arguments.  Where some legislators argued the 
bill protected federal employees from intimidation, others argued it infringed upon their civil 
liberties by restricting their ability to participate in political campaigns.  Aside from the liberty 
argument, legislators centered their speeches on the preservation of the constitutional system in 
the United States. 
 As the first legislator to speak against the bill, Representative Emmanuel Celler (D-NY) 
based his opposition on its potential effects on the Democratic Party.  He stated, “Personally, it 
makes no difference to me as far as my district is concerned.  My election does not depend upon 
Federal patronage job holders.  But I believe the bill hurts my party.  It goes too far.”  Bearing 
these remarks in mind, it is noteworthy to mention that Celler made the only argument grounded 
on the bill’s partisan effects. He elaborated: 
No member of the Cabinet could make a political speech.  No member of the Cabinet 
could help shape party doctrine, yet ours is a party system.  Somebody must appear on 
the radio and on the public platform to help create the party platforms and direct party 
policies.  It is only due to our bipartisan system that we have been enabled to make the 
progress we have been making all these years, one party checking upon the other.  These 
sections fly in the face of those theories and would make impossible, utterly impossible, 
the appearance before the public on the radio or on the platform of anyone who has a 
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semblance of public office, to announce what he thinks should be the principles and the 
practices of a party.134 
 
 Agreeing, Representative Harry P. Beam (D-IL) based his resistance on the bill’s impact 
on federalism.  “Is it not rather inconsistent . . . under the limitation our power of legislative 
enactment we can prescribe only limitations on a Federal election?” he contended, “These same 
Federal workers may engage actively and politically in any way they want in any local 
legislative or municipal campaign.  Therefore, the inconsistency and the absurdity of this 
provision is apparent to me or to anyone here.”135   
Taking Beam’s federal conclusion a step further, Representative Edward W. Creal (D-
KY) tied in the threat of totalitarianism. “You have heard a great deal of talk here about 
dictatorship and Hiterlism, but today you are proposing to reach out to millions of people who 
have never been sought to be touched by the Federal Government in the last 150 years and to gag 
them and handcuff them in the exercise of their political rights,” he contended, “This bill not 
only goes further than covering relief workers—and you can make that fence as stout as you 
please and I will support it—but you go into numerous other fields which I cannot support . . . it 
is the greatest invasion of States’ rights ever proposed in a quarter of a century.”136  For Creal, 
the gross extension of federal authority written into the Hatch Act resembled a totalitarian power 
grab. 
Creal was not the only legislator to draw this comparison.  Others viewed Section 9(a)’s 
campaign restrictions as a clear violation of constitutional rights.  Quoting President Abraham 
Lincoln, Representative Sam Hobbs (D-AL) claimed “If you do this thing, you not only violate 
the Constitution, you not only violate every natural right of every citizen in the United States, but 
                                                 
134 Ibid., 9596.  
135 Ibid., 9597. 
136 Ibid., 9599-9600.  
Myers 51 
by doing this you divest him of citizenship and you have set up the process of disintegration, 
whereby the Government ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people’ will have begun to 
perish from the earth.”137  Representative Charles Faddis (D-PA) buttressed the argument by 
emphasizing the foreign-ness of this restriction on civil liberties.  He reiterated, “It is a doctrine 
too un-American for me to follow.  To be willing to write a law saying to the employees of the 
Federal Government: ‘You are holding a Federal job, you shall not participate in political 
activity’ is the beginning of an invasion of civil liberties of the American people.”138 
But, no representative went as far as Representative Frank Hook (D-MI), who argued that 
the Hatch Act did not prevent totalitarianism or dictatorship, but caused it.  He argued: 
The provisions of this bill will take away from the American people that inherent right 
that was handed down to them by our founding fathers, sanctified by the blood of 
American patriots. If enacted into law, it will deprive the American people of the rights to 
express their opinion on Government, the right to take part in politics, and is beyond a 
doubt the furthest step that has been taken in the history of this Nation toward a 
dictatorship.  This Nation was born in politics.  Through politics it has advanced to the 
highest state of civilization known to man.  Might I be so bold as to say to you who are 
about to destroy our democracy that as long as you have Republicans and as long as you 
have Democrats you will have neither communism nor fascism.  But when you eliminate 
politics from government you will eliminate parties.  When you eliminate political 
parties, you have set up a totalitarian dictatorship in the in the pace of the greatest 
Government on this earth, and God forbid that that should ever happen . . . 
The majority party should carry on in the interest of good government and in the 
interest of the great mass of people, protecting our democratic rights under the 
Constitution of the United States and not take away those rights from the people. 
 
Moving to the legislators who championed the bill, they employed similar rhetoric in 
their floor speeches.  While the opposition voiced their concerns against totalitarianism, the 
supporters voiced their concerns against a national spoils system.  Representative Edward H. 
Rees (R-KS) fervently believed the welfare and administrative state was to blame for the United 
States’ social ills.  “If the billions of dollars that have been appropriated by Congress for the 
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needy and underprivileged during the past few years had been efficiently and economically 
administered and distributed we would not have the suffering which exists throughout our 
country today,” he lamented.  By passing the Hatch Act, Congress still had hope “to prevent the 
American Government from being controlled by the corruption of a spoils system.” 139 
Though he maintained reservations about Section 9(a) Representative J. Will Taylor (R-
TN) directly linked the need for the Hatch Act with the previous election cycle’s WPA 
corruption scandals.  “Only last week . . . a WPA superintendent was tried and convicted in the 
Federal court at Knoxville, Tennessee, in my congressional district, for misappropriation of 
WPA funds, and for levying political tribute on poor, unfortunate relief workers . . . Even 
destitute women on sewing projects on sewing projects were subjected to the impositions of 
these political vultures,” Taylor asserted.  He continued: 
It will be urged by some that this legislation will interfere with personal liberty.  Well, if 
the passage of this measure will secure those on Government relief from becoming the 
prey of political parasites and hijackers by interfering with their ‘liberty’ to coerce and 
exploit, then that is the strongest possible argument for its speedy enactment . . . 
 To me the lowest form of animal life is the creature who would levy tribute, 
political or otherwise, on the unfortunate recipients of Government relief, or who would 
undertake to influence their political action by either a promise of favor or by a threat of 
punishment or reprisal.  Such a creature, in my opinion, belongs to the category of ghouls 
and deserves the contempt and execration of all decent people . . . 
 I favor this bill as it passed the Senate.  The more teeth that can be put into it the 
better, so far as I am concerned.  I want to see the House bill amended in substantial 
conformity to the Senate bill.  Some clarification may be necessary, but we all fully 
realize that the objective of this legislation is to free those on Government relief from the 
talons of political harpies and to probity Government employees from engaging in 
pernicious political activities on Government time and at Government expense. 
 
Aside from their fear of a spoils system, these supporters also backed the bill to preserve 
free and fair elections in the United States.  Representative John Robinson (R-KY) based his 
position on the “common knowledge” that the “taxpayers’ money appropriated for WPA was 
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used to coerce and intimidate needy men, women and children.”  For him, the bill would “go far 
toward bringing about clean government in the Nation” for there was nothing “so important to a 
free people as to have honest, clean, and free elections.”140 
Concurring, Representative Hamilton Fish (R-NY) viewed the bill as “preserving a free 
ballot.”  He expounded, “Our free institutions today by a free people under a free ballot is being 
attacked more than ever.  Our very form parliamentary and representative government is more 
under attack than ever before.  We are told from abroad that popular government and democracy 
have failed.  Unless we pass legislation of this kind, upholding a free ballot and our free 
institutions and thereby our representative form of government, then gentleman, it is the 
beginning of free institutions, and you will soon have some form of dictatorial government in 
this country.”141  Creal, Faddis, and Hook had utilized the fear of dictatorial ambition to argue in 
the negative for the bill.  Here, Fish employed that same trepidation to argue in the affirmative. 
 Taking a different approach, Representative Raymond S. Springer (R-IN), interpreted this 
bill from the viewpoint of a WPA worker.  He asserted that its protections unified the American 
electorate by ensuring that all individuals were free from coercion.  He stated, “Can it be that we 
should continue to have two distinct class of citizens on election day? The one class would be 
composed of those people who are not on relief in any form, who would have the perfect right to 
go to the polls and cast their vote as they may desire . . . And, the other class would consist of the 
poor and unfortunate people—those who are forced to work on the WPA and those who are 
drawing direct relief—who would be subject to force, threats, restraint, and intimidation . . . 
whose freedom at the ballot box would have been taken away.”142 
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 After this extensive discussion, the time for debate expired.  Moving along with the 
legislative procedure, the bill passed the House with a clear majority (the final vote being 241-
134).143  The bill the returned to the Senate with its amendments on July 21.  With little 
discussion, the Senate agreed to the House changes.144 
 On August 2, 1939, Roosevelt signed the Hatch Act into law, but not without repeating a 
few reservations that Congress had held.  While he viewed the law as “an effective instrument of 
good Government,” he also warned that it “cannot properly preclude Government employees 
from the exercise of the right of free speech or from their right to exercise the franchise.”145  
Roosevelt’s reservations demonstrated that apprehension extended beyond the legislative 
branch.146 
VII. The Hatch Act’s Subsequent History  
  Deliberations on governmental employee political involvement did not end with the 
Hatch Act of 1939.  Addressing previous concerns, the following year, Congress passed 
subsequent legislation extending the act to the state and local level.147  In 1942, Congress 
loosened the law’s restriction to exempt school teachers from Section 9(a).148  Later, in 1950, 
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they lessened the penalty for violating the Hatch Act listed in section 9(b).  This amendment 
meant an employee found guilty would not necessarily be removed from their position.149 
Given the fierce constitutional debate that had occurred on the House floor in 1939, it 
was no surprise that Section 9(a) came before the Supreme Court in 1946 in United Public 
Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell (1946).150  Harry B. Mitchell, president of the United 
States Civil Commission, filed a Hatch Act claim against a George Poole, a Philadelphia mint 
worker, for working as a Democratic poll worker on election day.151  Poole challenged his 
removal on the grounds that the Hatch Act unconstitutionally restricted his freedom of speech.  
In a 4-3 decision, Associate Justice Stanley Reed found no discrepancy between the Hatch Act 
and the First Amendment, upholding the firing.152 
However, Associate Justice Hugo Black’s dissenting opinion echoed the libertarian cries 
of the legislators in 1939.  Referring to Section 9(a), he wrote: 
Our political system, different from many others, rests on the foundation of a belief in 
rule by the people—not some, but all the people.  Education has been fostered better to fit 
people for self-expression and good citizenship.  In a country whose people elect their 
leaders and decide great public issues, the voice of none should be suppressed—at least, 
such is the assumption of the First Amendment.  That Amendment, unless I 
misunderstand its meanings, includes a command that the Government must, in order to 
promote its own interest, leave the people at liberty to speak their own thoughts about 
government, advocate their own favored governmental causes, and work for their own 
political candidates and parties. 
The section of the Act here valid reduces the constitutionally protected liberty of 
several million citizens to less than a shadow of its substance.  It relegates millions of 
federal, state, and municipal employees to the role of mere spectators of events upon 
which hinge the safety and welfare of all the people including public employees.  It 
removes a sizable proportion of our electorate from full participation in affairs destined to 
mould the fortunes of the nation.  It makes honest participation in essential political 
activities an offense punishable by proscription from public employment.  It endows a 
governmental board with the awesome power to censor the thoughts, expressions, and 
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activities of law-abiding citizens in the field of free expression, from which no person 
should be barred by a government which boasts that it is a government of, for, and by the 
people—all the people.  Laudable as its purpose may be, it seems to me to hack at the 
roots of a Government by the people themselves, and, consequently, I cannot agree to 
sustain its validity.153 
 
 Without using the exact words, Justice Black also believed the law desecrated the values 
fundamental to American governance.  The Hatch Act certainly did not “censor the thoughts, 
expressions, and activities” of government employees, but this exaggeration emphasized liberty’s 
fragility.  If the federal government allowed one such infringement, it created legal precedent for 
future infringements.  
 In the 1967, towards the end of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society (another 
legislative program that greatly expanded the federal government’s scope), the Commission on 
Political Activity of Government Personnel, also known as the Hatch Act Commission, reviewed 
the law in order to make reform recommendations.  The committee advised that Congress amend 
the Hatch Act to give government employees some process to participate in political campaigns 
without losing their job.  Nonetheless, Congress failed to take any action based on the 
Commission’s considerations. 154 
Section 9(a) reappeared before the Court in United States Civil Service Commission Et 
Al. v. National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, Et Al. (1973)155  In a 6-3 decision, like 
Mitchell, the Court upheld the provision.  In his majority opinion, Justice Byron White employed 
historical examples to buttress the law’s constitutionality.  He wrote: 
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Our judgement is that neither First Amendment nor any other provision of the 
Constitution invalidates a law barring this kind of partisan political conduct by federal 
employees. Such decision on our part would no more than confirm the judgement of 
history, a judgement made by this country over the last century that it is in the best 
interest of the country, indeed essential, that federal service should depend upon 
meritorious performance rather than political service, and that the political influence of 
federal employees on others and on the electoral process should be limited . . . 
Early in our history, Thomas Jefferson was disturbed by the political activities of 
some of those in Executive Branch of the Government . . . 
The experience of the intervening years, particularly that of the 1936 and 1938 
political campaigns, convinced a majority in Congress that the prohibition against taking 
an active part in political management and poetical campaigns should be extended to the 
entire federal service . . . 
It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of 
the   Government, or those working for any of its agencies, should administer the law in 
accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance with their own or the will 
of a political party. They are expected to enforce the law and execute the programs of the 
Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or group or the 
members thereof. A major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of 
Government -- the impartial execution of the laws -- it is essential that federal employees, 
for example, not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play 
substantial roles in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan 
political tickets. Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and 
effective government.156 
 
Justice White’s defense mirrored the Republican position in the original House floor 
debates.  Because their employment tasked them with executing the law, it required them to 
remain publicly neutral.  
 But like Justice Black’s opinion three decades before, Associate Justice William Douglas, 
joined by Associate Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, dissented against 
Section 9 (a).  He posited: 
We deal here with a First Amendment right to speak, to propose, to publish, to petition 
Government, to assemble.  Time and place are obvious limitations.  Thus, no one could 
object if public employees were barred from using office time to engage in outside 
activities, whether political or otherwise.  But it is of no concern of Government what an 
employee does in his spare time, whether religion, recreation, social work, or politics is 
his hobby—unless what he does impairs efficiency or other facets of the merits of his job.  
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Some things, some activities do affect or may be thought to affect the employee’s job 
performance.  But his political creed, like his religion, is irrelevant.  In the areas of 
speech, like religion, it is of no concern what the employee says in private to his wife or 
in to the public in Constitution Hall.  If Government employment were only a ‘privilege,’ 
then all sorts of conditions might be attached.157 
 
Similar to Justice Black, he also argued a slippery slope.  By preventing federal 
employees from actively engaging with political campaigns, it opened the door for “all sorts of 
conditions.”  In conjunction, the two dissents from Justices Black and Douglas illustrated two 
points.  First, the civil liberty argument remained valid on a legal level; two of the nation’s top 
jurists agreed with the congressional legislators in that it violated crucial American rights.  
Second, they reiterated the notion that the Hatch Act had severe repercussions for governance 
beyond that of the federal workers. 
 Since Civil Service Commission, no major challenges to the Hatch Act have occurred.   
The Hatch Act has had an important place in the legal regulation of the executive branch across 
the twentieth century.  Despite Supreme Court challenges and political pushes, the law still 
defines how federal, state, and local government employees engage with political campaigns.158  
VIII. Why was the Hatch Act Passed? 
 The Hatch Act continues to have a lasting impact on the twentieth and twenty-first 
century.  Given the law’s permanence and contested constitutionality, it becomes important to 
understand why Congress passed the law.  This section analyzes the Hatch Act’s passage on 
partisan and constitutional grounds.  Though House Republicans only voted in favor of the bill, it 
was a bipartisan measure; Democrats like Senator Hatch had introduced the bill and voted for it 
in both chambers.  Bearing this point in mind, one must look elsewhere to explain why the Hatch 
Act passed Congress.  Instead, the evidence suggests that the WPA controversies, like the one in 
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Kentucky, evoked ideological concerns about the corruption of the constitutional system.  In all 
three branches of the federal government, the Hatch Act debate surpassed a discussion of 
political activities in work relief to a conversation on the powers and role of the national 
government. 
 Given that the New Deal and the WPA were part of the Democratic agenda, it would 
make sense for the Republican Party to support legislation restricting federal agency reach.  This 
consideration was more plausible considering the WPA scandals; if the Democratic Party was 
willing to use this agency to purge its own party members in primaries, then Republicans would 
have an electoral incentive to protect their own prospects.  But for most of the 1930s, the 
Democratic Party retained control of both the presidency and Congress.  Republicans would not 
regain the presidency until 1952 with the election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, nor would 
they regain Congress until 1947.  The Republican Party did not have the votes in Congress to 
pass the law without Democratic assistance.  Moreover, the threshold would be higher when 
considering the possibility of presidential veto. 
As Representative Celler noted in the congressional debate, “Both the Democrats and 
Republicans on the committee fashioned this bill.”159  Looking at its origins in the Senate, a 
Democratic senator introduced the bill which unanimously passed the Democrat-dominated 
floor.  In the House, both Democrats and Republicans voted for the bill.  Interestingly, only 
Democrats voted against the bill; Republicans either voted in favor of the Hatch Act or did note 
vote at all.160  When it reached the White House, Roosevelt even signed the bill without enacting 
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a veto.  While this action may have been necessary to avoid further criticism after the 1938 
“purges,” it revealed that he did not deem it too threatening to the Democratic Party. 
 From its inception, the Hatch Act was a bipartisan bill.  Congressional Republicans may 
have backed the bill because for its potential electoral effects, but this point does not provide a 
full account of the its passage.  A complete explanation must then consider a separate factor, 
something that transcended party boundaries.   
Examining the congressional debates covering the Hatch Act, one finds an interesting 
paradigm.  In the House, members centered their debates around civil liberties and the fear of 
totalitarianism in America.  On the one hand, some legislators felt the Hatch Act would serve as 
a legislative protection against the creation of a national political machine sustained by work 
relief agencies and a new spoils system.  On the other hand, other legislators argued that the 
Hatch Act created a slippery slope; if the government restricted these federal workers’ civil 
liberties, it would take the executive branch down the road to totalitarianism. 
This conversation lead to the constitutional aspect of the Hatch Act debate: that without 
it, an all-encompassing executive branch of the federal government would use agencies like the 
WPA to manipulate elections and violate civil liberties.  While executive agencies existed prior 
to the New Deal, legal historian Lawrence M. Friedman wrote, “it was a dramatic quickening, a 
ratcheting upward, that pushed the boundaries further and further into a kind of beyond.”  In 
reference to these new agencies, Friedman argued, “They raised the specter of dictatorships; of 
an all-powerful administrative state, a central-planning state, in which the little man would be 
crushed into dust.”161  Local WPA scandals in Kentucky and other states triggered this latent fear 
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of dictatorial totalitarianism and provided enough cause for Congress to act in a bipartisan 
manner by enacting a law covering all federal employees.  
To clarify, this apprehension existed outside the context of the Hatch Act debate. 
Congressman Charles Halleck (R-IN), who became House majority leader after WWII, voted for 
New Deal financial reforms such as Social Security, the Securities Exchange Commission, and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, but opposed the expansive administrative state that it 
had ushered in.  He once proclaimed, “Free Americans then will be following the road to 
serfdom under rigid governmental controls in every department of their lives . . . debt is slavery . 
. . excessive taxes is slavery . . . bureaucracy is slavery.”162   
Similarly, using Fargo, North Dakota, as a case study, historian David B. Danbom 
discovered that average Americans were not entirely receptive to the New Deal’s top-down 
governance, specifically with respects to the WPA’s employment measures.163  “Traditional 
assumptions and values continued to be held and asserted—sometimes quite aggressively when 
challenged by federal programs based on very different assumptions and values,” Danbom 
concluded, “New Deal programs were contested not just in Washington by Congressional 
conservatives and populist demagogues who opposed their creation, but in cities, states and 
counties where local officials who challenged their implementation.”164 
In the larger historical context, a comparison of the New Deal’s executive enlargement to 
totalitarianism stemmed from international circumstances.  When the global market toppled in 
1929, European states like Germany and Italy passed broad Enabling Acts, granting near 
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unlimited power to their heads of state.  Over the following years, these powers regained 
economic balance before the United States and other democracies, questioning whether liberal 
constitutionalism was sustainable.  In his recent award-winning work, Ira Katznelson stated, 
“The crisis of liberal democracy in Europe, Latin America, and East Asia in short, generated 
widespread apprehension about democratic incapacity as Franklin Roosevelt was about to 
assume the presidency.  As he and the country faced a night sky illuminated by barbarism in 
1933, they confronted confounding and pressing uncertainties.  Could the political system meet 
its most urgent tests without suspending its rule?  Might it be necessary to fashion a crisis 
government and transcend the limits of ordinary procedures in order to confront the economic 
crisis, respond to the dictators, and rescue the system?”165 
Initially, Roosevelt’s rhetoric bordered on similar action.  In his inaugural address, on 
March 4, 1933, he announced, “I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet 
the crisis—broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power 
that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”166  Despite this vague 
language, Roosevelt never crossed into dictatorial territory.  However, Katznelson observed that 
the executive branch drafted most New Deal legislation, expedited it through an abbreviated 
legislative process, and expanded its power through new agencies.167  In light of these deviations, 
Katznelson found that later in the 1930s, “Congress firmly established itself as a forum where 
detailed answers could be crafted to the main substantive challenges of a historically dense and 
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difficult era . . . In that painful and uneven process, the legislature was recast and reinvigorated 
as a site of decision and governance.”168 
Historian Barry D. Karl’s work reiterated this point.  “The congressional rebellion against 
the WPA reflects an even more profound effect of New Deal politics.  The fear of bureaucracy, 
of intellectuals managing government, and now of the very concept of government planning was 
no longer confined to a conservative minority,” argued Karl.169  He continued, “Roosevelt’s first 
plan for his second term had failed badly . . . The plan . . . had fallen victim to two historical 
fears.  One was the fear that identified rationalization with dictatorship and fascism.  The other 
was the fear that rationalization would destroy state and local control of the federal government’s 
power to distribute federal resources.”170  But while Roosevelt never crossed the line into 
dictatorship, Congress responded preemptively with the Hatch Act.   
IX. Conclusion: The Hatch Act’s Importance in Relation to New Deal Legal and Constitutional 
History 
 Examination of the Hatch Act’s origins illuminates a gap in United States constitutional 
and legal history: the New Deal after 1937.  Most general New Deal histories, from Schlesinger 
to Kennedy, shifted their attention from the New Deal’s domestic policies towards international 
affairs after the 1937 “court-packing” fight and the 1938 election “purges.” Legal and 
constitutional histories replicated this trend.  Though the New Deal’s administrative state 
remained into the twenty-first century, these historians dedicated little attention to the legislative 
side of its origins, focusing instead on the Supreme Court.  
                                                 
168 Ibid., 126.  
169 Barry D. Karl, The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945 (Chicago, Illinois: 
University Press of Chicago, 1983), 178. 
170 Ibid., 181.  
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On this note, Karl wrote on the Roosevelt administration’s legislative achievements and 
failures after 1937 in what he calls the “Third New Deal.”  This classification builds upon a 
preexisting trend in New Deal historiography where historians divide the program into two 
halves.  The first half, lasting from Roosevelt’s inauguration in 1933 to “Black Monday” in 
1935, focused on economic recovery through laws like the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the 
National Industrial Recovery Act.  The second half, lasting from 1935 until the 1937 “court-
packing” scheme, consisted more of reform measures like the Wagner Act and Social Security.  
Karl contended that the existing scholarship failed to consider legislation after 1937 but before 
the United States joined World War II.  Compared to Degler’s description of the New Deal as the 
“Third American Revolution,” Karl called these years the Thermidorian reaction to these liberal 
expansions.171 
 To expand upon Karl’s point, from 1933 to 1937, the federal government expanded at an 
unprecedented rate with the creation of the administrative and welfare states.  From 1937 to 
1940, however, Congress reigned in those liberal policies.  The Hatch Act was only one law to 
perform this function.  The few domestic victories that Roosevelt achieved, like the National 
Housing Act of 1937 and the Revenue Act of 1937, were offset by defeats like the Revenue Act 
of 1938, which reversed the progressive tax plan of the previous year, and the creation of the 
House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities, which investigated suspected fascists 
and communists in those newly created agencies.  As late as 1946, the Administrative Procedure 
Act established strict guidelines for administrative agency processes, determining what 
regulations they had the authority to impose.172   
                                                 
171 Ibid., 178-181.  
172 Ibid., 168-169.  
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 Legal histories focusing on the “constitutional revolution of 1937” overlooked this final 
phase.  After the New Deal’s victory with the “switch in time that saves nine,” authors like Barry 
Cushman and G. Edward White skipped to the Court’s broad reinterpretation of the Commerce 
Clause in Wickard v. Filburn.173  While the Court was more hospitable to the New Deal after 
1937, other dimensions of the legal realm were not.  To skip this legislation is to ascribe to the 
New Deal an incorrect historical legacy. Congress did not unquestionably accept every policy the 
executive branch requested.  As time progressed, Roosevelt faced numerous setbacks and 
retaliations against his hallmark agenda, like the Hatch Act of 1939.  In the words of scholar 
Maxwell Bloomfield, if the New Deal was a constitutional “peaceful revolution,” federal 










                                                 
173 The “switch in time that saves nine” is another term historians use to describe the “court-
packing” fight and its outcome. The “switch in time” refers to the Supreme Court’s transition to 
a pro-New Deal stance in 1937, “saving” them from Roosevelt’s bill. The “nine” refers to the 
nine Supreme Court justices who decided these cases.  
174 Maxwell Bloomfield, Peaceful Revolution: Constitutional Change and American Culture 
from Progressivism to the New Deal (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2000), 124-166. 
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Appendix I- The Original Text of the 1939 Hatch Act- 53 Stat. 1147.175 
An Act 
To prevent pernicious political activities. 
 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That it shall be unlawful for any person to intimidate, threaten, 
or coerce, or to attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any other person for the purpose of 
interfering with the right of such other person to vote or not vote as he may choose, or of causing 
such other person to vote for, or not to vote for, any candidate for the office of President, Vice 
President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of 
Representatives at any election held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting President, a 
Vice President, a Presidential elector, or any Member of the Senate or any Member of the House 
of Representatives, Delegates or Commissioners from the Territories and insular possessions.  
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person employed in any administrative position by the 
United States, or by any department, independent agency, or other agency of the United States 
(including any corporation controlled by the United States or any agency thereof, and any 
corporation all of the capital stock of which is owned by the United States or any agency 
thereof), to use his official authority for the purpose of interfering with, or affecting the election 
or the nomination of any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential 
elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of Representatives, Delegates or 
Commissioners from the Territories and insular possessions. 
Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to promise any 
employment, position, work, compensation, or other benefit, provided for or made possible in 
whole or in part by any Act any political activity or for the support of or opposition to any 
candidate or any political party in any election.  
Sec. 4. Except as may required by the provisions of subsection (b), section 9 of this Act, 
it shall be unlawful for any person to deprive, attempt to deprive, or threaten to deprive, by any 
means, any person of any employment, work, compensation, or other benefit provided for or 
made possible by any Act of Congress appropriating funds for work relief or relief purposes, on 
account of race, creed, color, or any political activity, support of, or opposition to any candidate 
or any political party in any election. 
Sec. 5. It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive or be in any manner 
concerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any 
political purpose whatever from any person known by him to be entitled to or receiving 
compensation, employment or other benefit provided for or made possible by any Act of 
Congress appropriating funds for work relief or relief purposes.  
Sec. 6. It shall be unlawful for any person for political purposes to furnish or to disclose, 
or to aid or assist in furnishing or disclosing, any list or names of persons receiving 
compensation, employment, or benefits provided for or made possible by any Act of Congress 
appropriating, or authorizing the appropriation of, funds for work relief or relief purposes, to a 
political candidate, committee, campaign manager, or to any person for delivery to a political 
                                                 
175 This text was transcribed from Patricia Ann Fiori, The Hatch Act- Present Text and Statutory 
History of Provisions (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1975), 18. 
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candidate, committee, or campaign manager, and it shall be unlawful for any person to receive 
any such list or names for political purposes. 
Sec. 7. No part of any appropriation made by any Act, heretofore or hereafter enacted, 
making appropriations for work relief, relief, or otherwise to increase employment by providing 
loans and grants for public-work projects, shall be used for the purpose of, and no authority 
conferred by any such Act upon any person shall be exercised or administered for the purpose of, 
interfering with, restraining, or coercing nay individual in the exercise of his right to vote at any 
election. 
Sec. 8. Any person who violates any of the foregoing provisions of this Act upon 
conviction thereof shall be find not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, 
or both. 
Section 9. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person employed in the executive branch of the 
Federal Government, or any agency or department thereof, to use his official authority or 
influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof.  No 
officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or any agency or 
department thereof, shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns.  
All such persons shall retain the right to vote as they may choose and to express their opinions on 
all political subjects.  For the purposes of this section the term “officer” or “employee” shall not 
be construed to include (1) the President and Vice President of the United States; (2) persons 
whose compensation is paid from the appropriation for the office of the President; (3) heads and 
assistant heads of executive departments; (4) officers who are appointed by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who determine policies to be pursued by the 
United States in its relations with foreign powers or in the Nation-wide administration of Federal 
laws.  
(b) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be immediately removed 
from the position or office held by him, and thereafter no part of the funds appropriated by any 
Act of Congress for such position or office shall be used to pay the compensation of such person.  
Sec. 9A. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person employed in any capacity by any agency 
of the Federal Government, whose compensation, or any part thereof, is paid from funds 
authorized or appropriated by any Act of Congress, to have membership in any political party or 
organization which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government in the 
United States.  
(2) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be immediately removed 
from the position or office held by him, and thereafter no part of the funds appropriated by any 
Act of Congress for such position or office shall be used to pay the compensation of such person.  
Sec. 10. All provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, not in substitution for, of 
existing law.  
Sec. 11. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or 
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and the application of such provision to 
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Appendix III- The modern Hatch Act- 5 U.S. Code Chapter 15- Political Activity of Certain 
State and Local Employees 
 
5 U.S. Code 1501- Definitions 
 
For the purpose of this chapter— 
(1)“State” means a State or territory or possession of the United States; 
(2)“State or local agency” means the executive branch of a State, municipality, or other political 
subdivision of a State, or an agency or department thereof, or the executive branch of the District 
of Columbia, or an agency or department thereof; 
(3)“Federal agency” means an Executive agency or other agency of the United States, but does 
not include a member bank of the Federal Reserve System; and 
(4)“State or local officer or employee” means an individual employed by a State or local agency 
whose principal employment is in connection with an activity which is financed in whole or in 
part by loans or grants made by the United States or a Federal agency, but does not include— 
(A)an individual who exercises no functions in connection with that activity; or 
(B)an individual employed by an educational or research institution, establishment, 
agency, or system which is supported in whole or in part by— 
(i) a State or political subdivision thereof; 
(ii) the District of Columbia; or 
(iii) a recognized religious, philanthropic, or cultural organization. 
 
1502- Influencing elections; taking part in political campaigns; prohibitions; exceptions 
 
(a) A State or local officer or employee may not— 
(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting 
the result of an election or a nomination for office; 
(2) directly or indirectly coerce, attempt to coerce, command, or advise a State or local 
officer or employee to pay, lend, or contribute anything of value to a party, committee, 
organization, agency, or person for political purposes; or 
(3) if the salary of the employee is paid completely, directly or indirectly, by loans or 
grants made by the United States or a Federal agency, be a candidate for elective office. 
(b) A State or local officer or employee retains the right to vote as he chooses and to 
express his opinions on political subjects and candidates. 
(c)Subsection (a)(3) of this section does not apply to— 
(1) the Governor or Lieutenant Governor of a State or an individual authorized by 
law to act as Governor; 
(2) the mayor of a city; 
(3) a duly elected head of an executive department of a State, municipality, or the 
District of Columbia who is not classified under a State, municipal, or the District 
of Columbia merit or civil-service system; or 
(4) an individual holding elective office. 
Myers 73 
 
1503-Nonpartisan candidacies permitted 
 
Section 1502(a)(3) of this title does not prohibit any State or local officer or employee from 
being a candidate in any election if none of the candidates is to be nominated or elected at such 
election as representing a party any of whose candidates for Presidential elector received votes in 
the last preceding election at which Presidential electors were selected. 
 
1504- Investigations; notice of hearing  
 
When a Federal agency charged with the duty of making a loan or grant of funds of the United 
States for use in an activity by a State or local officer or employee has reason to believe that the 
officer or employee has violated section 1502 of this title, it shall report the matter to the Special 
Counsel. On receipt of the report or on receipt of other information which seems to the Special 
Counsel to warrant an investigation, the Special Counsel shall investigate the report and such 
other information and present his findings and any charges based on such findings to the Merit 
Systems Protection Board, which shall— 
(1) fix a time and place for a hearing; and 
(2) send, by registered or certified mail, to the officer or employee charged with the 
violation and to the State or local agency employing him a notice setting forth a summary 
of the alleged violation and giving the time and place of the hearing. 
 
The hearing may not be held earlier than 10 days after the mailing of the notice. 
 
1505- Hearings; adjudications; notice of determinations 
 
Either the State or local officer or employee or the State or local agency employing him, or both, 
are entitled to appear with counsel at the hearing under section 1504 of this title, and be heard. 
After this hearing, the Merit Systems Protection Board shall— 
(1) determine whether a violation of section 1502 of this title has occurred; 
(2) determine whether the violation warrants the removal of the officer or employee from 
his office or employment; and 
(3) notify the officer or employee and the agency of the determination by registered or 
certified mail. 
1506- Orders; withholding loans or grants; limitations 
 
(a)When the Merit Systems Protection Board finds— 
(1) that a State or local officer or employee has not been removed from his office or 
employment within 30 days after notice of a determination by the Board that he has 
violated section 1502 of this title and that the violation warrants removal; or 
(2) that the State or local officer or employee has been removed and has been appointed 
within 18 months after his removal to an office or employment in the same State (or in 
the case of the District of Columbia, in the District of Columbia) in a State or local 
agency which does not receive loans or grants from a Federal agency; the Board shall 
make and certify to the appropriate Federal agency an order requiring that agency to 
withhold from its loans or grants to the State or local agency to which notice was given 
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an amount equal to 2 years’ pay at the rate the officer or employee was receiving at the 
time of the violation. When the State or local agency to which appointment within 18 
months after removal has been made is one that receives loans or grants from a Federal 
agency, the Board order shall direct that the withholding be made from that State or local 
agency. 
 
(b) Notice of the order shall be sent by registered or certified mail to the State or local 
agency from which the amount is ordered to be withheld. After the order becomes final, the 
Federal agency to which the order is certified shall withhold the amount in accordance with the 
terms of the order. Except as provided by section 1508 of this title, a determination or order of 
the Board becomes final at the end of 30 days after mailing the notice of the determination or 
order. 
 
(c) The Board may not require an amount to be withheld from a loan or grant pledged by a State 
or local agency as security for its bonds or notes if the withholding of that amount would 
jeopardize the payment of the principal or interest on the bonds or notes. 
 
1507- Subpoenas and depositions 
 
(a) The Merit Systems Protection Board may require by subpoena the attendance and testimony 
of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence relating to any matter before it as a 
result of this chapter. Any member of the Board may sign subpoenas, and members of the Board 
and its examiners when authorized by the Board may administer oaths, examine witnesses, and 
receive evidence. The attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence may 
be required from any place in the United States at the designated place of hearing. In case of 
disobedience to a subpoena, the Board may invoke the aid of a court of the United States in 
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary 
evidence. In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to a person, the 
United States District Court within whose jurisdiction the inquiry is carried on may issue an 
order requiring him to appear before the Board, or to produce documentary evidence if so 
ordered, or to give evidence concerning the matter in question; and any failure to obey the order 
of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof. 
 
(b) The Board may order testimony to be taken by deposition at any stage of a proceeding or 
investigation before it as a result of this chapter. Depositions may be taken before an individual 
designated by the Board and having the power to administer oaths. Testimony shall be reduced to 
writing by the individual taking the deposition, or under his direction, and shall be subscribed by 
the deponent. Any person may be compelled to appear and depose and to produce documentary 
evidence before the Board as provided by this section. 
 
(c) A person may not be excused from attending and testifying or from producing documentary 
evidence or in obedience to a subpoena on the ground that the testimony or evidence, 
documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a 
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is 
compelled to testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before the Board in 
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obedience to a subpoena issued by it. A person so testifying is not exempt from prosecution and 
punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. 
 
1508- Judicial Review 
A party aggrieved by a determination or order of the Merit Systems Protection Board under 
section 1504, 1505, or 1506 of this title may, within 30 days after the mailing of notice of the 
determination or order, institute proceedings for review thereof by filing a petition in the United 
States District Court for the district in which the State or local officer or employee resides. The 
institution of the proceedings does not operate as a stay of the determination or order unless— 
(1) the court specifically orders a stay; and 
(2) the officer or employee is suspended from his office or employment while the 
proceedings are pending. 
 
A copy of the petition shall immediately be served on the Board, and thereupon the Board 
shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the record on which the determination or 
order was made. The court shall review the entire record including questions of fact and 
questions of law. If application is made to the court for leave to adduce additional 
evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence may 
materially affect the result of the proceedings and that there were reasonable grounds for 
failure to adduce this evidence in the hearing before the Board, the court may direct that 
the additional evidence be taken before the Board in the manner and on the terms and 
conditions fixed by the court. The Board may modify its findings of fact or its 
determination or order in view of the additional evidence and shall file with the court the 
modified findings, determination, or order; and the modified findings of fact, if supported 
by substantial evidence, are conclusive. The court shall affirm the determination or order, 
or the modified determination or order, if the court determines that it is in accordance 
with law. If the court determines that the determination or order, or the modified 
determination or order, is not in accordance with law, the court shall remand the 
proceeding to the Board with directions either to make a determination or order 
determined by the court to be lawful or to take such further proceedings as, in the opinion 
of the court, the law requires. The judgment and decree of the court are final, subject to 
review by the appropriate United States Court of Appeals as in other cases, and the 
judgment and decree of the court of appeals are final, subject to review by the Supreme 
Court of the United States on certiorari or certification as provided by section 1254 of 
title 28. If a provision of this section is held to be invalid as applied to a party by a 
determination or order of the Board, the determination or order becomes final and 














Caudill, Harry M. and Dale Deaton.  “Interview with A.B. ‘Happy’ Chandler, November 6, 
1978.”  Louie B. Nunn Center for Oral History- University of Kentucky Libraries, 
November 6, 1978, https://kentuckyoralhistory.org/catalog/xt74mw28cm6c. 
Roosevelt, Franklin D and Samuel Rosenman, ed.  The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt.  New York: Random House, 1938. 
Stokes, Thomas L.  Chip off my Shoulder.  Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1940. 
United States 76 Congress.  United States Congressional Record.  76th Congress, 1st Session, 
1939, vol. 4, pts. 7-10.  
United States 76 Congress.  Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Senatorial Campaign 
Expenditures and Use of Governmental Funds in 1938 Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 
283 Seventy-Fifth Congress and Senate Resolution No. 290 Seventy-Fifth Congress.  
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1939. 
United States Constitution. 
Newspaper Articles: 
“Barkley Bag Origin Explained.”  Courier Journal, July 10, 1938. 
“Chandler in Race for Senate Against Barkley, Terms Foe Stranger and ‘Man of Words.”  
Courier Journal, February 23, 1938. 
“The Commonwealth in Reivew.”  Courier Journal, June 18, 1939. 
“Porter urges WPA Head to Oust Goodman.”  Courier Journal, May 30, 1939. 
Myers 77 
Court Cases: 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).  
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 
(1973).  
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
West Coast Hotel Company v. Elsie Parrish, et ux., 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
Secondary Sources 
Books  
Barkley, Alben W.  That Reminds Me—.  Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1954.  
Bernstein, Barton J.  “The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform.”  In 
Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History, edited by Barton J. 
Bernstein, 263-288.  New York: Pantheon Books, 1968. 
Myers 78 
Blakey, George T.  Hard Times & New Deal in Kentucky, 1929-1939.  Lexington, Kentucky: 
University, Press of Kentucky, 1986.   
Braeman, John.  “The New Deal and the ‘Broker State:’ A Review of the Recent Scholarly 
Literature.”  The Business History Review (Winter 1972): 409-429. 
Brinkley, Alan.  The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War.  New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. 
Brinkley, Alan.  “The New Deal and the Idea of the State.” In Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, ed., 
The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980.  Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton: 
85-121.  
Burns, James MacGregor.  Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox.  New York: Smithmark Books, 
1956.  
Conkin, Paul.  The New Deal.  New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1967.  
Cushman, Barry.  Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Danbom, David B.  “National Ideas and Local Power in Fargo, North Dakota, during the Great 
Depression.” In Bruce J. Schulman, ed., Making the American Century: Essays on the 
Political Culture of Twentieth Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014): 37-50. 
Degler, Carl N.  Out of Our Past: Forces that Shaped Modern America.  New York: Harper & 
Row, 1959. 
Eccles, James R.  The Hatch Act and the American Bureaucracy.  New York: Vantage Press, 
1981.  
Myers 79 
Farley, James A.  Behind the Ballots: The Personal History of a Politician.  New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938.  
Farley, James A.  Jim Farley’s Story: The Roosevelt Years.  New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc., 1948. 
Freidel, Frank.  Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny.  Boston, Massachusetts: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1990. 
Freidel, Frank.  The New Deal in Historical Perspective.  Washington, D.C.: Service Center for 
Teachers of History, 1959.  
Friedman, Lawrence M. American Law in the 20th Century.  New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 2002. 
Graham, Jr., Otis.  An Encore for Reform: The Old Progressives and the New Deal.  New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1967. 
Hamby, Alonzo L.  Liberalism and Its Challengers: From F.D.R. to Bush.  New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992. 
Harrison, Lowell H. and James C. Klotter.  A New History of Kentucky.  Lexington, Kentucky: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1997.  
Hofstadter, Richard.  The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.  New York: Vintage Books, 
1955. 
Horwitz, Morton J.  The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860.  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977. 
Howard, Donald S.   The WPA and Federal Relief Policy.  New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1943. 
Myers 80 
Hurst, James Willard.  “Legal Elements in United States History.”  In Law in American History, 
edited by Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn.  Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1971. 
Ickes, Harold L.  The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon.  New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1943.  
Irons, Peter.  The New Deal Lawyers.  Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982. 
Katznelson, Ira.  Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time.  New York: Liveright 
Publishing Corpoartion, 2013.  
Kennedy, David M.  Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-
1945.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Leuchtenburg, William E.  Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940.  New York: 
Harper Colophon Books, 1963. 
Leuchtenburg, William E.  The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age 
of Roosevelt.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Libbey, James K.  Dear Alben: Mr. Barkley of Kentucky.  Lexington, Kentucky: University Press 
of Kentucky, 1979.  
Patterson, James T.  Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal.  Lexington, Kentucky: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1967. 
Patterson, James T.  The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition.  Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969. 
Pearce, John Ed.  Divide and Dissent: Kentucky Politics, 1930-1963.  Lexington, Kentucky: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1987. 
Purcell, Aaron D., ed.  Interpreting American History: The Great Depression and the New Deal.  
Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 2014.  
Myers 81 
Radosh, Ronald.  “The Myth of the New Deal.”  In A New History of Leviathan: Essays on the 
Rise of the American Corporate State, edited by Ronald Radosh, 148-187.  New York: 
E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1972. 
Rhodes, Delmer Gibson.  “The Hatch Act” A Historical and Constitutional Analysis.”  M.A. 
Thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1973. 
Robinson, Edgar Eugene.  The Roosevelt Leadership, 1932-1945.  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 
J.B. Lippincott Company, 1955. 
Roll, David.  The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat 
Hitler.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.  
Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M.  The Age of Jackson.  Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1945. 
Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M.  The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933.  
Boston, Massachusetts: Mariner Books, 1957. 
Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M.  The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal, 1933-1935.  
Boston, Massachusetts: Mariner Books, 1958. 
Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M.  The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval, 1935-1936.  Boston, 
Massachusetts: Mariner Books, 1960. 
Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M.  The Cycles of American History.  Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1986. 
Sherwood, Robert E.  Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History.  New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1948.  
Smith, Jason Scott.  Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works, 
1933-1956.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Myers 82 
Smith, Jean Edward.  FDR.  New York: Random House, 2007. 
Taylor, Nick.  American-Made: The Enduring Legacy of the WPA: When FDR Put the Nation to 
Work.  New York: Bantam Books, 2008. 
White, G. Edward.  The Constitution and the New Deal.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2000. 
Williams, William Appleman.  The Contours of American History.  Chicago, Illinois: 
Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1961.  
Zinn, Howard., ed.  New Deal Thought.  New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966. 
Zinn, Howard.  The Politics of History.  Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1970.  
Articles 
Auerbach, Jerold S.  “New Deal, Old Deal, or Raw Deal: Some Thoughts on New Left 
Historiography.  Journal of Southern History 35 (Feb. 1969): 18-30. 
Boyd, Donald C.  “The Book of Women: The WPA Pack Horse Library Project, 1936-1943.”  
Libraries & the Cultural Record 42 (2007): 111-128.  
Clement, Priscilla Ferguson.  “Works Progress Administration in Pennsylvania, 1935 to 1940.” 
The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 95 (April 1971): 253-256. 
Fuller, Robert L.  “Halleck’s New Deal: Congressman Charles Halleck and the Limits to 
Reform.”  Indiana Magazine of History 103 (March 2007): 66-92. 
Hixson, Walter L.  “The 1938 Senate Election: Alben W. Barkley, ‘Happy’ Chandler, and the 
New Deal.”  The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 80 (Summer 1982): 309-
329.  
Jones, Charlie O.  “Reevaluating the Hatch Act: A Report on Political Activity of Government 
Personnel.”  Public Administration Review 29 (May/June 1969): 249-254. 
Myers 83 
 
Kidd, Stuart.  “Redefining the New Deal: Some Thoughts on the Political and Cultural 
Perspectives on Revisionism.”  Journal of American Studies 22 (Dec. 1988): 389-415.  
Leupold, Robert J.  “The Kentucky WPA: Relief and Politics, May-November 1935.”  Filson 
Club Historical Quarterly 49 (1975): 152-168.  
Martin, Philip L.  “The Constitutionality of the Hatch Act: Second Class Citizenship for Public 
Employees.”  University of Toledo Law Review 6 (1974): 78-109. 
Porter, David.  “Senator Carl Hatch and the Hatch Act of 1939.”  New Mexico Historical Review 
48 (1973): 151-164. 
Vaughn, Robert G.  “Restrictions on the Political Activities of Public Employees: The Hatch Act 
and Beyond.”  George Washington Law Review 44 (1976): 516-553. 
Zelizer, Julian E.  “The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal: Fiscal Conservatism and the 
Roosevelt Administration, 1933-1938.”  Presidential Studies Quarterly 30 (Jun. 2000): 
331-358.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Myers 84 
 
